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Abstract
Antineutrinos have been proposed as a means to safeguard nuclear reactors for more
than 30 years and there has been impressive experimental progress in antineutrino
detection that makes this method increasingly practical for use by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper we conduct, for the first time, a case study of
the application of antineutrino safeguards to a real-world scenario – the North Korean
nuclear crisis in 1994. We derive detection limits to a partial or full core discharge in
1989 based on actual IAEA safeguards access and find that two independent methods
would have yielded positive evidence for a second core with very high confidence. To
generalize our results, we provide detailed estimates for the sensitivity to the plutonium
content of various types of reactors, including most types of plutonium production
reactors, based on detailed reactor simulations. A key finding of this study is that a
wide class of reactors with a thermal power of 0.1-1 GWth can be safeguarded achieving
IAEA goals for quantitative sensitivity and timeliness with antineutrino detectors right
outside the reactor building. This type of safeguards does not rely on the continuity
of knowledge and provides information about core inventory and power status in real-
time.
†Email:pahuber@vt.edu
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1 Introduction
The first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, at the end of World War II, had a profound and
permanent impact on foreign relations and international security. While initially there was
some hope that the secrets of the manufacture of nuclear weapons would remain exclusively
in the hands of the United States, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear device in 1949.
Several times during the Cold War, the world stood at the brink of nuclear armageddon.
It was only due to the strong commitment of political leaders on both sides and the high
degree of professionalism in the armed forces that the disaster of a nuclear war could be
averted 1. During the Cold War, nuclear security was essentially a bipolar issue between the
United States and the Soviet Union; other players like Great Britain (1952), France (1960),
and China (1964) appeared at the fringes but did not play a major role for most parts. To
some degree independently of Cold War politics, Israel and South Africa launched a nuclear
weapons program in the early 60s and 70s, respectively, which in both cases was triggered by
unique national security needs – a small minority population surrounded by hostile neigh-
bors, which in turn resulted in a rather unusual alliance.2 South Africa, quite remarkably,
relinquished its nuclear weapons and the associated infra-structure towards the end of the
apartheid regime in 1991.3 India’s nuclear program was launched quite early and presumably
was a direct response to its deteriorating relations with Pakistan. Also confrontations with
China over territories in the Himalayas in combination with China obtaining a permanent
seat on the UN Security Council contributed significantly to the decision to go nuclear. Ob-
viously, India’s possession of nuclear weapons since 1974, then created a perceived need for
nuclear armament in Pakistan, which first tested a nuclear device in 1998. The last country
to join the circle of nuclear armed nations was the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
1. Thomas Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (Presidio Press, 2004). For a
different perspective, why we the Cold War remained cold, see for instance Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of
Safety (Princeton University Press, 1993).
2. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South
Africa (Pantheon, 2010).
3. James Doyle, ed., “Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Tech-
nology and Policy,” in (Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), chap. 16.
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(DPRK) with its first nuclear test in 2006.
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature
in 1968, entered into force in 1970, and on May 11, 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely.4
The NPT is, with exception of the UN charter, the most widely accepted international
treaty to date. Currently, 190 states are party to the NPT. The legal mechanisms for IAEA
safeguards, as set out in article III of the NPT, are bi-lateral agreements between individual
member states and the IAEA. These so-called comprehensive safeguards agreements have
been put into force by all but 12 of the non-nuclear-weapons states.5 The Additional Protocol
was introduced in response to the failure of the regular safeguards scheme to provide timely
indication of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program before the first Gulf War in 1990.
The Additional Protocol in particular provides IAEA inspectors with the right to collect
environmental samples at locations outside of declared facilities and to obtain access to
sites which have not been declared as nuclear facilities but are suspected to be. These
provisions close an important gap in the regular safeguards scheme, which relies on a state’s
declaration of nuclear facilities and materials. 139 states have signed the Additional Protocol,
and 117 states have put it into force.6 The regular safeguards scheme could only confirm
the correctness of a state’s declaration of nuclear activities; with the Additional Protocol,
the completeness of the declaration can also be addressed7. It can be argued that the
correctness aspect of safeguards is working quite well. No case of diversion of fissile material
has been documented at safeguarded facilities, which presumably is due to the fact that a
potential proliferator deems the risk of discovery to be unacceptably high.8 However, the
completeness aspect remains troubling, especially for those states which have not put the
4. “NPT,” http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml (accessed November 19,
2013).
5. “NPT status,” http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/nptstatus_overview.
html (accessed December 18, 2013).
6. “IAEA webpage,” http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/index.shtml (accessed Septem-
ber 13, 2012).
7. In principle, special inspections could also provide the means to verify the completness, independent of
whether the Additional Protocal is in force.
8. Sergey Zykov, “IAEA Instrumentation for the Future,” in Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Meeting of
the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) (2012).
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additional protocol into force, such as Iran.
Neutrinos were postulated by Wolfgang Pauli in 1930 and have been experimentally dis-
covered by Clyde Cowan and Fred Reines9 in 1956 using neutrinos10 from the Savannah
River reactor. Neutrinos are nearly massless, electrically neutral, spin 1/2 particles and play
a central role in the electroweak Standard Model of particle physics. Neutrinos participate
only in weak interactions and therefore possess unusual penetrating power – no practical
means to attenuate or to shield neutrinos are known. Neutrinos are copiously produced
in the beta-decays of fission fragments and this makes nuclear reactors the most powerful
artificial neutrino source. The basic concept to monitor nuclear reactors using neutrinos was
proposed by Borovoi and Mikaelyan in 1978.11 There have been a number of quantitative
studies of the level of accuracy at which the plutonium content in a reactor can be deter-
mined using neutrinos,12 and different authors seem to come to different conclusions. Closer
inspection of those results reveal that very different assumptions about detector capabilities
are made and also the level of statistical analysis, particularly in terms of rates versus spec-
tral information, is very different. These differences likely account for the variety of opinions
on the feasibility and quantitative accuracy of neutrino safeguards. In particular, the as-
sumptions about detector capabilities seem to be strongly influenced by earlier safeguards
detector deployments and do not reflect modern state-of-the-art neutrino detectors. We will
9. C. L. Cowan et al., “Detection of the free neutrino: A Confirmation,” Science 124 (1956): 103–104,
doi:10.1126/science.124.3212.103.
10. To be precise, a reactor is a source of electron antineutrinos. In the interest of brevity and given the
fact that here we are dealing only with electron antineutrinos, we will use the term neutrino, instead.
11. A. A. Borovoi and L. A. Mikaelyan, “Possibilities of the practical use of neutrinos,” Soviet Atomic
Energy 44 (1978): 589.
12. Adam Bernstein et al., “Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with anti-neutrino detectors” (2001);
Michael Martin Nieto et al., “Detection of anti-neutrinos for nonproliferation” (2003); Patrick Huber and
Thomas Schwetz, “Precision spectroscopy with reactor anti-neutrinos,” Phys. Rev. D70 (2004): 053011,
doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.70.053011; A.C. Misner, “Simulated Antineutrino Signatures of Nuclear Reactors
for Nonproliferation Applications” (PhD diss., Oregon State University, 2008); A. Bernstein et al., “Nuclear
Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current Capabilities and Future Prospects,” Sci.Global
Secur. 18 (2010): 127–192; Vera Bulaevskaya and Adam Bernstein, “Detection of Anomalous Reactor Ac-
tivity Using Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution Over the Course of a Reactor Cycle,” J.Appl.Phys. (2010);
A.C. Hayes et al., “Theory of Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels,” Phys.Rev. C85
(2012): 024617, doi:10.1103/PhysRevC.85.024617; Patrick Huber, “Spectral antineutrino signatures and
plutonium content of reactors,” in Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Ma-
terials Management (INMM) (2012).
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discuss these issues in detail in section 2. We will not discuss the application of neutrinos
for long-range detection of nuclear activities13.
Here, we present the first case study of a real safeguards scenario – the first nuclear crisis
in the DPRK in 1994.14 Earlier studies of neutrinos for safeguards are, to a large degree, based
on pre-conceived notions of how safeguards of a particular reactor type work, and thus do not
allow critical examination of the strength and weaknesses of neutrino safeguards as compared
to more conventional means. In many cases, this comparison seems to disfavor neutrinos, not
because neutrinos do not offer any new capabilities, but because the conventional techniques
are specifically designed to work well in those standard scenarios.15 On the other hand,
inventing scenarios in which the standard methods fail brings about the criticism that these
scenarios are artificial, unrealistic, and contrived for the sole purpose of demonstrating the
usefulness of neutrinos. In the rare case that any of these scenarios would reflect an actual
concern of the professional safeguards community, it is far from obvious that anyone in that
community would want to admit it. Therefore, what is needed is a real-world case in which
conventional methods did not yield the desired outcome for the IAEA and for which sufficient
information is publicly available to perform a detailed technical analysis. The first North
Korean nuclear crisis fits this bill on all accounts and we, therefore, have chosen it as our
sandbox to explore the abilities and limitations of neutrino safeguards. Despite the brief
discussion of the impact neutrino safeguards might have had on the unfolding of history in
section 6.2, the main thrust of this study is not an attempt at counter-factual history but to
demonstrate that under real-world constraints and boundary conditions, neutrino safeguards
can provide a decisive advantage over conventional techniques, in particular, with a view of
the next nuclear crisis in some other part of the world.
This paper is organized as follows: the technical aspects of neutrino safeguards and the
13. for a recent review on this topic, see Glenn R. Jocher et al., “Theoretical antineutrino detection,
direction and ranging at long distances,” Phys.Rept. 527 (2013): 131–204, doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2013.
01.005
14. Joel S. Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear
Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 2007).
15. Zykov, “IAEA Instrumentation for the Future.”
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general principles applicable to a wide range of reactor types and situations are presented
in section 2 . In particular, figure 2 is one of our main results. In section 3, we present
a summary of the first North Korean nuclear crisis based mostly on historic records. The
specific features of the North Korean nuclear program relevant to this study are summarized
in section 4. In section 5, we apply the techniques developed in section 2 to the particular
problems posed by the North Korean nuclear program and provide detailed quantitative
analysis for four detector deployment options. The resulting improvements in the quanti-
tative understanding of the DPRK’s nuclear program and in particular the assessment of
the veracity of the initial declaration of the DPRK to the IAEA are discussed in Sec 6.
Also, a critical comparison to conventional techniques is offered. We summarize in section 7.
Appendices A to C provide the details of our reactor simulations.
2 Antineutrino reactor safeguards
The fact that nuclear reactors are powerful neutrino sources was realized soon after nuclear
reactors became practical. Neutrinos are not directly produced in nuclear fission but result
from the subsequent beta-decays of the neutron-rich fission fragments. On average there are
about 6 neutrinos per fission emitted and thus, for one gigawatt of thermal power a flux of
about 1020 s−1 neutrinos is produced. The total number of emitted neutrinos is proportional
to the total number of fissions in the reactor. Moreover, the distribution of fission fragments,
and hence their beta-decays, are different for different fissile isotopes. Thus, careful neutrino
spectroscopy should provide information not only on the total number of fissions but also
about the fission fractions of the various fissile isotopes contained in the core. The basic
concepts16 of both power monitoring and observing the plutonium content of a reactor were
experimentally demonstrated in pioneering work performed by a group from the Kurchatov
Institute lead by Mikaelyan. They deployed a neutrino detector of about 1 m3 volume at the
16. Borovoi and Mikaelyan, “Possibilities of the practical use of neutrinos.”
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Rovno nuclear power plant. For the power measurement, an agreement with the thermal
measurements was found to within 2.5%17 and the effect due to a changing plutonium content
was demonstrated;18 more recently the quantitative accuracy has been studied as well.19 This
allows one to determine the plutonium content and power level of the reactor core in situ at
a standoff distance of 10’s of meters.20 The practical feasibility of reactor monitoring using
neutrinos has also been demonstrated using a small, tonne-size detector at the San Onofre
power station, called SONGS.21
2.1 Neutrino detection
Beginning with the discovery of the neutrino, inverse beta-decay (IBD) has been the workhorse
of reactor neutrino experiments
ν¯e + p→ n+ e+ (1)
In IBD, an electron antineutrino interacts with a proton to produce a neutron and a positron.
Due to the mass difference of a neutron and a proton as well as the mass of the positron, this
process has an approximate energy threshold of (mn−mp +me)c2 = 1.8 MeV. The positron
will go on to annihilate with a nearby electron producing a pair of 511 keV gamma rays.
This energy deposition is typically detected together with the kinetic energy of the positron
Ee and thus the visible energy in detector, Evis = Ee + 2 × 511 keV. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between neutrino energy and the positron energy Eν = Ee + 1.8 MeV. Here
we neglect the recoil energy of the neutron which is much smaller than the energy resolution
of even the best neutrino detectors. Therefore, a measurement of Evis directly translates into
17. V. A. Korovkin et al., “Measuring Nuclear Plant Power Output by Neutrino detection,” Soviet Atomic
Energy (1988): 712–718.
18. Yu. V. Klimov et al., “Measurement of variations of the cross section of the reaction ν¯e + p→ e+ + n
in the ν¯e flux from a reactor,” Sov. J. Nucl. Phys. 51, no. 2 (1990): 225–258.
19. Huber and Schwetz, “Precision spectroscopy with reactor anti-neutrinos.”
20. Yu. A. Klimov et al., “Neutrino method remote measurement of reactor power and power output,”
Atomic Energy 76, no. 2 (1994): 123–127; Huber, “Spectral antineutrino signatures and plutonium content
of reactors.”
21. A. Bernstein et al., “Monitoring the Thermal Power of Nuclear Reactors with a Prototype Cubic Meter
Antineutrino Detector,” J.Appl.Phys. 103 (2008): 074905, doi:10.1063/1.2899178.
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a measurement of the neutrino energy Eν .
The reaction in equation 1 also results in a neutron, which in itself is invisible to the
detector, but will slow down in collisions with the detector material and eventually undergo
neutron capture. A careful choice of the nucleus on which the neutron captures allows
tailoring this signature. Common neutron capture agents are gadolinium, e.g. Daya Bay22
or lithium, e.g. Bugey.23 In the case of gadolinium, the signature of neutron capture is the
emission of several gamma rays with a total energy of 8 MeV, whereas in the case of lithium
the signature is the production of an alpha particle and a 3H nucleus. The slowdown and
capture of the neutron requires a characteristic time, allowing for what is called a delayed
coincidence: there is a primary energy deposition from the positron followed somewhat later
by a neutron capture signal. This delayed coincidence is key to separate neutrino events from
backgrounds. The neutron capture cross sections of both gadolinium and lithium are much
larger than of any of the other detector materials. Therefore, even small concentrations at
a level of a percent or less will result in the majority of neutron captures occurring on those
nuclei.
Eventually, all signatures will result in ionization and this ionization is detected by using
organic scintillator which can be either liquid or solid. The organic nature of the scintillator
provides the free protons for the interaction in equation 1. Recently, there have been three
experiments24 aimed at fundamental physics employing gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator
at a large scale of several 10 tonnes without any safety incidents and excellent long-term
stability. Specifically, throughout this paper we consider a 5 t detector based on organic
scintillator corresponding to 4.3 × 1029 target protons. A real detector will not have 100%
efficiency and to obtain the same number of events a larger detector will be needed. Many
22. F.P. An et al., “Observation of electron-antineutrino disappearance at Daya Bay,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 108
(2012): 171803, doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.171803.
23. Y. Declais et al., “Search for neutrino oscillations at 15-meters, 40-meters, and 95-meters from a nuclear
power reactor at Bugey,” Nucl.Phys. B434 (1995): 503–534, doi:10.1016/0550-3213(94)00513-E.
24. Y. Abe et al., “Indication for the disappearance of reactor electron antineutrinos in the Double Chooz
experiment,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 108 (2012): 131801, doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.131801; An et al., “Obser-
vation of electron-antineutrino disappearance at Daya Bay”; J.K. Ahn et al., “RENO: An Experiment for
Neutrino Oscillation Parameter θ13 Using Reactor Neutrinos at Yonggwang” (2010).
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neutrino detectors with efficiencies above 50% have been built and thus even a realistic
detector yielding the same event numbers would be less than 10 t. A standard 20 feet
intermodal shipping container has an interior volume of 33.1 m3 and a net load capacity of
28.2 t, thus even a 10 t neutrino detector fits easily within such a container together with
its support systems. The neutrino spectrum is divided in energy from 1.8 MeV to 8 MeV in
bins of 0.2 MeV width, which at 4 MeV approximately corresponds to 10%/
√
E resolution,
which is similar to the resolution of recent experiments.25 We checked that a resolution half
as good would yield virtually identical results. For the IBD cross section we use the result
of Vogel and Beacom26 corrected for a neutron lifetime of 878.5 s27. For all measurements
at reactors, the standoff is 20 m, which for both of the considered reactors would allow for
deployment outside the reactor building. Such a detector at this standoff would typically
register about 5,000 events per year for a reactor operating at 1 MWth throughout that year.
2.2 Reactor flux models
More than 99% of the power in reactors, in a uranium fuel cycle, is produced in the fission
of four isotopes: uranium-235, plutonium-239, uranium-238, and plutonium-241. A reactor
with fresh fuel starts with only fissions in the uranium isotopes and plutonium is produced
via neutron capture on uranium-238 as the burn-up increases. The total neutrino flux from
a reactor φ can be written as
φ(E) =
∑
I
fISI(E) , (2)
25. Abe et al., “Indication for the disappearance of reactor electron antineutrinos in the Double Chooz
experiment”; An et al., “Observation of electron-antineutrino disappearance at Daya Bay”; Ahn et al.,
“RENO: An Experiment for Neutrino Oscillation Parameter θ13 Using Reactor Neutrinos at Yonggwang.”
26. P. Vogel and John F. Beacom, “Angular distribution of neutron inverse beta decay,” Phys.Rev. D60
(1999): 053003, doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.60.053003.
27. This values is taken from () and is very close to the value of 880 s currently recommended by the Particle
Data Group,. () It should be mentioned that there still are measurements deviating significantly from that
value by several standard deviations, see e.g.. ()
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where fI is the fission rate in isotope I and SI(E) is the neutrino yield for the isotope I.
The thermal power of the reactor is also given in terms of the fission rates
Pth =
∑
I
fIpI , (3)
where pI is the thermal energy release in one fission of the isotope I; we use the values for pI
given by Kopeikin.28 In order to be able to disentangle the contributions of the four isotopes,
we need to know the neutrino yields SI . These neutrino yields, in principle, are given by the
neutrino spectra νk(E) of each fission fragment k and the cumulative fission yield for each
fragment, Y Ik ,
SI(E) =
∑
k
Y Ik νk(E) , (4)
where k typically runs over about 800 isotopes. In practice, we do not know the neutrino
spectrum of a given fission fragment, but have only information regarding the beta spectrum
and in many cases this knowledge is inaccurate, incomplete, or entirely missing. Even for
a well known beta spectrum, significant complications arise from the conversion of a beta
spectrum into a neutrino spectrum since each individual beta-decay branch has to be treated
separately. As a result, a direct computation of the neutrino yields SI via the summation of
all individual neutrino spectra will be of limited accuracy,29 but in many cases is the only
available method.
A more accurate method is based on the measurement of the integral beta spectrum of all
fission fragments30 and subsequently the neutrino spectrum can be reconstructed from those
28. V. Kopeikin, L. Mikaelyan, and V. Sinev, “Reactor as a source of antineutrinos: Thermal fission energy,”
Phys.Atom.Nucl. 67 (2004): 1892–1899, doi:10.1134/1.1811196.
29. Th. A. Mueller et al., “Improved predictions of reactor antineutrino spectra,” Phys. Rev. C 83, no.
5 (2011): 054615, doi:10.1103/PhysRevC.83.054615; M. Fallot et al., “New antineutrino energy spectra
predictions from the summation of beta decay branches of the fission products,” Phys.Rev.Lett. 109 (2012):
202504, doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.109.202504.
30. F. Von Feilitzsch, A.A. Hahn, and K. Schreckenbach, “Experimental beta spectra from Pu-239 and
U-235 thermal neutron fission products and their correlated anti-neutrino spectra,” Phys.Lett. B118 (1982):
162–166, doi:10.1016/0370-2693(82)90622-0; K. Schreckenbach et al., “Determination of the anti-neutrino
spectrum from U-235 thermal neutron fission products up to 9.5 MeV,” Phys.Lett. B160 (1985): 325–330,
doi:10.1016/0370-2693(85)91337-1; A.A. Hahn et al., “Anti-neutrino spectra from Pu-241 and Pu-239
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measurements.31 This method is less dependent on nuclear data about individual fission
fragments but is not entirely free from uncertainties related to effects of nuclear structure.32
We need to point out that the problem of neutrino yields has recently received significant
scrutiny. Until the 2011 work by a group from Saclay,33 the results by Schreckenbach et al.,34
obtained in the 1980s at the Institut Laue-Langevin in Grenoble were considered the gold
standard. The Saclay group, in preparation of the Double Chooz neutrino experiment,35
revisited the previous results in an attempt to reduce the uncertainties. Instead, they found
a upward shift of the central value of the average yield by about 3% while the error budget
remained largely unchanged. This result, in turn, requires a reinterpretation of a large
number of previous reactor neutrino experiments, since this changes the expected number
of events. Together with the changes of the value of the neutron lifetime36 and corrections
from so-called non-equilibrium effects, the previous experiments appear to observe a deficit
in neutrino count rate of about 6%; this is called the reactor antineutrino anomaly and
was first discussed by Mention et al..37 The initial result on the flux evaluation and the 3%
upward shift was independently confirmed by one of the authors.38 A plausible explanation
could come in the form of a new particle, a sterile neutrino, which is not predicted by the
Standard Model of particle physics. Given the far-flung consequences of the existence of this
thermal neutron fission products,” Phys.Lett. B218 (1989): 365–368, doi:10.1016/0370-2693(89)91598-0;
N. Haag et al., “Experimental Determination of the Antineutrino Spectrum of the Fission Products of 238U”
(2013).
31. Patrick Huber, “On the determination of anti-neutrino spectra from nuclear reactors,” Phys.Rev. C84
(2011): 024617, doi:10.1103/PhysRevC.85.029901,10.1103/PhysRevC.84.024617.
32. Huber, “Anti-neutrino spectra”; A.C. Hayes et al., “Reanalysis of the Reactor Neutrino Anomaly”
(2013).
33. Mueller et al., “Improved predictions.”
34. Von Feilitzsch, Hahn, and Schreckenbach, “Experimental beta spectra from Pu-239 and U-235 thermal
neutron fission products and their correlated anti-neutrino spectra ”; Schreckenbach et al., “Determination
of the anti-neutrino spectrum from U-235 thermal neutron fission products up to 9.5 MeV ”; Hahn et al.,
“Anti-neutrino spectra from Pu-241 and Pu-239 thermal neutron fission products .”
35. Abe et al., “Indication for the disappearance of reactor electron antineutrinos in the Double Chooz
experiment.”
36. Fred E. Wietfeldt and Geoffrey L. Greene, “Colloquium : The neutron lifetime,” Rev. Mod. Phys. 83
(4 2011): 1173–1192.
37. G. Mention et al., “The Reactor Antineutrino Anomaly,” Phys.Rev. D83 (2011): 073006, doi:10.1103/
PhysRevD.83.073006.
38. Huber, “Anti-neutrino spectra.”
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sterile neutrino a considerable level of research activity ensued39.
In table I the event rate predictions for various flux models are compared for the four fissile
isotopes. The ENSDF flux model is based on thermal neutron fission yields of uranium-235,
plutonium-239, and plutonium-241 from the JEFF database, version 3.1.1;40 the fast neutron
fission yield of uranium-238 from the ENDF-349 compilation conducted at Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory;41 and on the beta-decay information contained in the Evaluated Nuclear
Structure Data File (ENSDF) database, version VI.42 The neutrino spectrum is computed
following the prescription of Huber.43 Our ENSDF model represents a very crude summa-
tion calculation and we reproduce the measured total beta spectra44 to within about 25%.
A state-of-the-art summation calculation is given by Fallot et al.,45 where great care is taken
to replace the ENSDF entries with high quality experimental data where available and to
use a carefully selected mix of databases. This model reproduces the measured total beta
spectra46 to within 10%. Finally, a direct deconvolution of the neutrino spectra from the
total beta data was performed by Huber47 for the isotopes uranium-235, plutonium-239, and
plutonium-241, which to this date represents the most accurate neutrino yields for those
isotopes. We note that the absolute values differ significantly between models, but once we
normalize the predictions for total rate and mean energy to that of uranium-235, the predic-
39. for a recent review, see K.N. Abazajian et al., “Light Sterile Neutrinos: A White Paper” (2012)
40. “JEFF database,” http://www.oecd-nea.org/dbdata/jeff/\#library.
41. T. R. England and B.F. Rider, ENDF-349 Evaluation and Compilation of Fission Product Yields: 1993,
LA-UR-94-3106, technical report (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1994).
42. “ENSDF database,” http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/ensdf/.
43. Huber, “Anti-neutrino spectra.”
44. Von Feilitzsch, Hahn, and Schreckenbach, “Experimental beta spectra from Pu-239 and U-235 thermal
neutron fission products and their correlated anti-neutrino spectra ”; Schreckenbach et al., “Determination of
the anti-neutrino spectrum from U-235 thermal neutron fission products up to 9.5 MeV ”; Hahn et al., “Anti-
neutrino spectra from Pu-241 and Pu-239 thermal neutron fission products ”; Haag et al., “Experimental
Determination of the Antineutrino Spectrum of the Fission Products of 238U.”
45. Fallot et al., “New antineutrino energy spectra predictions from the summation of beta decay branches
of the fission products.”
46. Von Feilitzsch, Hahn, and Schreckenbach, “Experimental beta spectra from Pu-239 and U-235 thermal
neutron fission products and their correlated anti-neutrino spectra ”; Schreckenbach et al., “Determination of
the anti-neutrino spectrum from U-235 thermal neutron fission products up to 9.5 MeV ”; Hahn et al., “Anti-
neutrino spectra from Pu-241 and Pu-239 thermal neutron fission products ”; Haag et al., “Experimental
Determination of the Antineutrino Spectrum of the Fission Products of 238U.”
47. Huber, “Anti-neutrino spectra.”
14
Table I: Rates and mean energies 〈E〉 for a 1 MWth reactor in a 1 t detector at a standoff of 10 m
measuring for 1 year for each individual isotope, assuming that only this isotope is fissioning. The
three different flux models are explained in the text. Ratios are given relative to uranium-235.
ENSDF Fallot Huber
rate 〈E〉 〈E〉 ratio 〈E〉 〈E〉 ratio 〈E〉 〈E〉
ratio [MeV] ratio ratio [MeV] ratio ratio [MeV] ratio
uranium-235 1 4.48 1 1 4.28 1 1 4.25 1
uranium-238 1.53 4.59 1.024 1.56 4.45 1.040
plutonium-239 0.64 4.26 0.950 0.65 4.13 0.965 0.66 4.04 0.951
plutonium-241 0.93 4.47 0.998 0.90 4.23 0.988 0.91 4.13 0.971
tions become very similar. In other words, the difference in neutrino yield and mean energy
between the fissile isotopes is consistently predicted by the various flux models – which is
not surprising given that these differences have their origin in the fission yields.
In practice, the current errors of any flux model are significant and a set of calibration
measurements at reactors of known fissile content is likely required to mitigate the effect
of these uncertainties, particularly in view of the reactor antineutrino anomaly. A proof of
concept at a theoretical level for these calibrations has been performed.48 On the experimental
side, the Daya Bay collaboration has demonstrated the ability to cross-calibrate a set of 8
neutrino detectors to within better than 0.5%.49
2.3 Reactor physics
The connection between fission rates and mass inventory requires a more detailed look at the
reactor physics inside the core; our ultimate goal is to infer mass inventories. For a neutron
flux which is constant in time and space, the fission rate and mass of a given fissile isotope
have a simple linear relationship
fI = φn σI mI , (5)
48. Huber, “Spectral antineutrino signatures and plutonium content of reactors.”
49. F.P. An et al., “A side-by-side comparison of Daya Bay antineutrino detectors,” Nucl.Instrum.Meth.
A685 (2012): 78–97, doi:10.1016/j.nima.2012.05.030.
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where mI is the mass of isotope I, σI is the energy averaged fission cross section and φn is
the neutron flux. Throughout the evolution of the core, all factors on the right hand side of
equation 5 will change. Due to burn-up effects, the mass mI will change and the neutron flux
typically will be adjusted to compensate for changes in reactivity while maintaining constant
power. The accumulation of fission fragments will change the neutron absorption, which,
in turn, alters the neutron energy spectrum; the cross section σI will evolve as well. The
evolution of the isotopic content can be described by a set of Bateman equations and neutron
transport methods can be used to recompute the relevant cross sections. We have performed
evolution or burn-up calculations for several reactor types using the SCALE software suite.50
For the further discussion it is useful to introduce fission fractions zI , which are defined by
zI =
fI∑
I fI
with
∑
I
zI = 1 . (6)
This definition has the advantage that the problem can be phrased independently of reactor
power. For illustration, the time evolution of the zI for a graphite moderated, natural
uranium fueled reactor is given in the left hand panel of figure 1, where the fission fractions
are shown as a function of the burn-up. zPu241 is very close to zero in this type of reactor and
therefore is not visible in this figure. The fission rate in uranium-238 stays constant since
the amount of uranium-238 in the reactor changes very little with time. There is a clear
anti-correlation between the fission fractions in uranium-235 and plutonium-239. The anti-
correlation is nearly exact as shown in the right hand panel of figure 1 and we will make use
of this later. In this context, it turns out that the burn-up is a useful variable which allows
a summary of the reactor inventory with a single number. Burn-up measures the number of
fissions which have occurred per unit of fuel mass or, in other terms, the amount of energy
extracted; the unit for burn-up is MWd/t. For example, 1 tonne of fuel producing 5 MW for
1 day yields a burn-up of 5 MWd/t; the same burn-up would be obtained by 1 tonne of fuel
50. “SCALE,” http://www.ornl.gov/sci/scale.
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Figure 1: The left hand panel shows the evolution of the fission fractions in a graphite moderated
natural uranium fueled reactor as a function of burn-up. The right hand panel shows the anti-
correlation of the fission fractions in uranium-235 and plutonium-239.
running at 1 MW for 5 days. Neglecting radioactive decays, the isotopic composition of both
samples would be identical since the total number of fissions which took place is the same.
As a result, the reactor core evolution is, to a very high degree of accuracy, a function of
only the burn-up. That is, details of the power history, like innage factors and shut downs,
have only a minor impact on the reactivity and fission fractions. The amount of plutonium
produced depends on the details of the reactor operations and so does the resulting neutrino
signal. Therefore, we need to have a reasonably accurate model of the reactor power history,
which in turn serves as input for a detailed reactor physics calculation. Neutrino emission
is a result of radioactive decay of fission fragments and therefore, fuel of the same burn-up
will have, to very good approximation, the same isotopic composition and will produce the
same distribution and amount of neutrinos at a given power level. Therefore, our ability
to predict the neutrino emission over time relies on an accurate model of the burn-up as a
function of time.
This burn-up calculation also allows for the study of the time evolving relation between
fission fractions and mass inventory as given in equation 5. We find, to very good accuracy,
this is a linear relationship and the time evolution of the proportionality constant φnσI ,
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throughout the fuel cycle, is very small. Using a fixed value for φnσPu239, throughout the
reactor cycle, induces a root mean square error of 2% for plutonium mass determinations for
a graphite moderated reactor and errors of similar size for the other reactor types considered
later. This type of sensitivity study needs to be performed for each reactor type and design.
Also, the actual values of φnσI have to be determined for each specific case.
2.4 Plutonium content determination
The difference in the spectral neutrino yield, of the four fissile isotopes, can be used to
disentangle the contribution of each of those isotopes to the total neutrino flux. In order to
do so, we set up a binned χ2-analysis, where the event rate in each bin ni is given as
ni = N
∑
I
fI
∫ Ei+∆E/2
Ei−∆E/2
dE σ(E)SI(E) , (7)
where Ei is central energy of bin i, ∆E is the bin width and σ(E) is the IBD cross section.
N is an overall normalization constant set by the detector mass, or number of free protons,
detection efficiency, and time interval of data taking. In order to compute the event rates ni,
we have to specify the four fission rates f = (fU235, fU238, fPu239, fPu241). We denote the true
or input values for our calculation by a superscript 0, i.e. the true fission rates are f0 and,
in the same way, we will denote the ni computed for the true values f
0 as n0i . We define the
χ2-function as
χ2(f) :=
∑
i
(ni(f)− n0i )2
n0i
, (8)
This χ2-function will be zero for f = f0. The allowed region for f is obtained by requiring
that
χ2(f) ≤ χ2c , (9)
where the critical value χ2c is determined from a χ
2 probability distribution with, in this case,
4 degrees of freedom. If we are only interested in the total number of fissions in plutonium
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given by fPu = fPu239 + fPu241, the following marginalized function has to be used
χ¯2(fPu) = min
fU235,fU238,κ
χ2(fU235, fU238, (1− κ)fPu, κfPu) , (10)
and in this case, since we are interested only in the single parameter fPu the number of
degrees of freedom is 1. Similarly, we can define a corresponding single parameter function
for the measurement of reactor power.
To relate a measured value of fPu to the mass inventory, a reactor physics simulation is
required. fPu will be proportional to the plutonium mass, mPu, in the reactor
γ =
mPu
fPu
, (11)
where γ is the proportionality constant. Therefore, a measurement of fPu translates into a
determination of mPu. γ, in turn, depends on the details of the reactor physics as well as the
instantaneous reactor thermal power; note that according to equation 5, γ = 1/(φnσPu) and
thus is inverse to the neutron flux density φn. The determination of mPu and its connection
to γ is clearly illustrated in figure 2, where we show the accuracy in the determination
of mPu for a variety of reactor types as a function of the thermal power. This figure is
based on a full calculation of the reactor burn-up, where “C, NU” corresponds to a graphite
moderated reactor running on natural uranium and the dot on this line is the 5 MWe reactor,
whose simulation details are explained in appendix A. “H2O, HEU” and “H2O, HEU + NU”
correspond to the IRT with drivers only and to the IRT with drivers and targets, respectively.
The details of the simulation are explained in appendix. C. The case “H2O, LEU” is computed
for a typical pressurized light water reactor. We have taken a power history from one such
reactor, with a total fuel load of 72.4 MTU51 enriched to 3.7%. The case “D2O, NU” describes
a heavy water moderated reactor running on natural uranium modeled on a CANDU design
51. MTU stands for metric tonne of uranium and is often synonymous with metric tonnes of heavy metal
(HM), where heavy refers to all actinides including plutonium.
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Figure 2: Absolute accuracy in the determination of the plutonium content based on the
measurement of the neutrino spectrum as a function of the thermal power of the reactor. The
different lines stand for different types of reactors as indicated by the labels: the first term
indicates the type of moderator, whereas the second part denotes the fuel type, natural uranium
(NU), low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium (HEU). This figure assumes a
5 t detector, a standoff of 15 m from the reactor core, and 90 days of data taking. The horizontal
line labeled “IAEA goal” indicates the accuracy which corresponds to the detection of 8 kg of
plutonium at 90% confidence level.
with a 8.6 MTU natural uranium fuel load and running at 40 MWth. The 40 MWth point on
this line resembles, in many aspects, the Iranian reactor at Arak52 and the accuracy would
be at the level of 2.7 kg within 90 days. The details of the calculations for the “H2O, LEU”
and “D2O, NU” can be found in appendix B. The horizontal line corresponds to a sensitivity
to 8 kg plutonium within 90 days, which is the stated IAEA goal53.
For all of those quite different reactor types the accuracy of a mPu measurement can be
described by the following simple relation
δmPu = 1.942 kg
(
γ
10−16kg s
)(
L
m
)(
Pth
MW
)1/2(
tonnes
M
)1/2(
days
t
)1/2
, (12)
52. David Albright and Christina Walrond, Update on the Arak Reactor, technical report (Institute for
Science and International Security (ISIS), 2013).
53. The IAEA uses this interpretation of the term significant quantity as the design basis for planning
routine inspections in declared facilities. Any amount of fissile material diversion, or undeclared production,
would be sufficient to warrant suspicion and follow-up activities to determine whether or not non-compliance
might be considered by the IAEA Board of Governors.
20
where L is the standoff of the neutrino detector, Pth is the average thermal reactor power, M
is the detector mass in tonnes (assuming 8.65×1028 protons per tonne), and t is the length of
the data taking period. Table II lists the corresponding values of γ, and using those values,
Table II: The values of γ for a number of reactor types.
reactor type C, NU H2O, HEU H2O, HEU+NU D2O, NU H2O, LEU
γ [1016 kg s] 2.889 0.064 0.337 0.299 0.108
equation 12 reproduces the results of the full calculation within a few percent. For graphite
moderated reactors, we find that the resulting δmPu is significantly larger, by a factor of
at least 8.5, than for any other reactor type we have investigated. As we will show in the
following, the fact that neutrino safeguards still yield meaningful results and are applicable
for this reactor type is a testimony to the great versatility and power of this technique.
For most reactor running conditions, the variation in γ is very small and depends only
very weakly, at the level of a few percent, on burn-up and reactor history. This implies that
our result most likely will hold up even for detailed 3-dimensional reactor physics calculations,
taking into account spatial burn-up variations.
We further observe, that for reactors with a thermal power in excess of 1 GWth, which is
the bulk of all reactors globally used for electricity production, this approach to safeguards
will have difficulties in meeting the IAEA goal of detection of 1 significant quantity, which
for plutonium is 8 kg, within 90 days54. On the other hand, neutrino safeguards is quite
straightforward for research, small modular reactors, and plutonium production reactors.
As discussed in the previous section, the fission fractions and thus the fission rates are
not independent from each other but are coupled by the physics inside the reactor; for an
illustration, see the right hand panel of figure 1. In trying to determine the plutonium mass
inventory, we can make use of these correlations. Basically, reactor physics determines how
the fission rates evolve together with burn-up. Therefore, a reactor model will provide the
54. Plutonium in irradiated fuel is a so-called indirect use nuclear material and the precise IAEA goal is a
90% or higher confidence level detection of the diversion of 1 significant quantity within 90 days, according
to International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA safeguards glossary (International Atomic Energy Agency,
2002).
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fission rates as a function of burn-up. This allows a rephrasing of the fitting problem in terms
of one independent quantity – the burn-up. The result of the analysis will be a value for burn-
up and some error bounds and since the reactor model also provides all the mass inventories
as a function of burn-up, a measurement of the burn-up translates into a measurement of the
core inventory and the errors can be determined by standard error propagation. In the case
of the graphite moderated reactor this reduces the error in plutonium mass determination
by roughly 50%; for details, see section 5.1. One potential drawback is the reliance on a
reasonably accurate reactor model. In cases where there is reliable design information and
the key operating parameters are known the burn-up model will reproduce the core inventory
to within the 5-10% range, which for most purposes will be a small extra contribution to
the overall error budget. In those cases, where the reactor design and operating parameters
have to be considered as unknown or the knowledge is deemed unreliable, a fit to fission
fractions and power should be performed. The loss in sensitivity is moderate compared to
the increase in reliability of the result.
3 Summary of the 1994 crisis
The DPRK is rather unique in many regards, including its use of a nuclear weapons program
as a bargaining tool. The direct tactical use of its small and crude nuclear arsenal against the
U.S., or its regional allies like South Korea or Japan, is presumably deterred by the threat of
U.S. retaliation. It is a serious concern that North Korea may share its nuclear know-how,
materials, or even a fully functional weapon with third parties, but the fear of the likely
attribution in case of a nuclear incident and the accompanying U.S. reaction may counteract
this risk.55 So far, North Korea obtained the largest benefit from its nuclear adventures by
offering to abstain in the future. For the use as a bargaining tool, it is desirable to create a
large degree of ambiguity about the type and scope of nuclear activities. At the same time,
55. Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou, “Dangerous Dealings: North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities and
the Threat of Export to Iran,” Arms Control Today (2007).
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there are indications that North Korea was surprised by the level of information IAEA could
glean from environmental sampling and allowing the IAEA to employ this method in the
intial inspections may have been a serious miscalculation on the side of North Korea.56 The
three nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 have removed a great deal of ambiguity about
the kind and goal of North Korea’s nuclear activities, but they shed no light on the scope of
activities and the size of the resulting arsenal. New concerns have surfaced relating to the
uranium enrichment program.57
The DPRK signed the NPT on December 12, 1985; a safeguards agreement entered into
force on April 10, 1994; and notice of withdrawal from the treaty was given on January 10,
2003.58 On February 26, 1993, the IAEA called for special inspections, which in retrospect
may have been counterproductive,59 to resolve the discrepancies found during the first safe-
guards inspections in 1992. The issue of contention was the amount of plutonium the DPRK
had separated from spent nuclear fuel – North Korea declared it produced about 90 g,60 but
IAEA data allowed for the possibility of a much larger amount, maybe as much as 14 kg,61
which would be sufficient to build two or more nuclear bombs. On March 12, 1993, the
DPRK declared its intention to leave the NPT by June 12, 1993 after being threatened with
special inspections but was persuaded by the U.S. on June 11 not to do so. A detailed
representation of the time line is given in figure 3.
IAEA safeguards ended in 2003 and therefore we would like to focus on the time before
2003. Would antineutrino reactor safeguards have been able to reduce the pre-2003 ambigui-
ties about the DPRK’s plutonium production program and what would the potential impact
of this information on the development of the crisis have been?
56. Mohamed ElBaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (Metropolitan
Books, 2011).
57. Siegfried Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex” (Center for Interna-
tional Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 2010).
58. David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency : the first forty years (The Agency,
1997).
59. ElBaradei, Age of Deception.
60. Don Oberdorfer, The two Koreas: a contemporary history (Basic Books, 2001), p. 269.
61. David Albright, “How much plutonium does North Korea have?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50,
no. 5 (1994): 46.
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North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but it took until spring of 1992 for a safeguards
agreement to enter into force. North Korea started its 5 MWe reactor at Yongbyon in 1986.
In 1989 there was a 70 day shutdown, providing an opportunity to unload between 50-100%
of the spent fuel in the core. In its initial declaration to IAEA in 1992, North Korea indicated
that they ran a one-time reprocessing campaign in 1990 that resulted in 90 g of plutonium
from a limited number of damaged fuel rods removed during the 1989 shutdown. The results
of IAEA environmental sampling conducted during the first safeguards inspection in 1992,
however, indicated at least three campaigns of reprocessing in 1989, 1990, and 199162 which
in turn admits the hypothesis that a significant fraction of the spent fuel had been removed in
1989 and subsequently reprocessed. As a result, a larger amount of separated plutonium may
have been obtained by the DPRK, possibly sufficiently large to build two or more nuclear
bombs. Given the ramifications of these findings, IAEA Director General Hans Blix insisted
on a definitive resolution of this question as a precondition to declare the DPRK to be in
compliance with its commitments under the NPT. In particular, finding and sampling the
reprocessing waste streams was a priority for IAEA, eventually triggering the request for
special inspections.63 The diplomatic exchange between IAEA and the DPRK dragged on in
parallel with negotiations between the DPRK and the U.S.; the latter eventually leading to
the Agreed Framework. In April 1994 North Korea forced the issue by beginning to unload
spent fuel from the reactor core. An analysis of the gamma-radiation of spent fuel taken at
known positions in the reactor core would have resolved the question of how much spent fuel
was discharged in 1989 and whether the North Korean declaration was correct. Knowing the
original position of a sample in the reactor core is crucial for this analysis, since the fission
rate is higher in the center than at the edge of the core; for technical details of this method
see section 6.1. However, the unloading proceeded very fast and it appears as if the operators
took deliberate steps to obliterate any information about the original position of each fuel
element in the reactor; effectively, IAEA inspectors could only observe the unloading but
62. Albright, “How much plutonium does North Korea have?”
63. O. Heinonen, Interview by PH, April 16 2013.
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Figure 4: A map of relevant boundaries and geographies of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Contours
show expected inverse beta-decay event rates for a 5 t detector over the course of a year. X’s
mark the location of various neutrino detectors used in the paper. The satellite image on which
this map is based was taken on May 16, 2013 by GeoEye-1.
were unable to take any meaningful measurements of any individual fuel elements as they
were being removed, or to make a connection between the fuel elements and the core locations
they had occupied. As a result, crucial evidence was denied to the IAEA and on June 2, 1992
Blix declared that the ability to resolve the issue had been “seriously eroded”.64 The fuel
discharged in 1994 was canned using U.S. equipment and subsequently was put into storage
and was under IAEA surveillance until 2003, when the DPRK declared its withdrawal from
the NPT. The 1994 crisis was resolved by the so called Agreed Framework under which the
DPRK halted any plutonium production and fuel reprocessing in exchange for the promise to
obtain two pressurized light-water reactors at not cost.65 The Agreed Framework unraveled
in 2003 and eventually, in 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test explosion.
4 Plutonium production in the DPRK
A comprehensive account of the history of the North Korean nuclear program is provided by
Hecker.66 For our purposes, three facilities are relevant: a Soviet supplied research reactor
64. Albright, “How much plutonium does North Korea have?”
65. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical .
66. Hecker and Liou, “Dangerous Dealings”; Siegfried Hecker, “Lessons learned from the North Korean
nuclear crises,” Dædalus Winter (2010): 44–56.
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with a power of around 8 MWth, the IRT; a graphite moderated reactor with a thermal power
of approximately 20 MWth, which generally is referred to by its electrical power, hence the
name 5 MWe; and the Radiochemical Laboratory, which is a reprocessing facility which
allows for the extraction of plutonium from the spent fuel from the 5 MWe reactor. These
facilities and their relative locations are shown in figure 4. Features such as the river and
relevant buildings are outlined, neutrino detector locations are marked, and IBD event rate
iso-contours are shown.
In the 1960s, the IRT was supplied by the Soviet Union.67 This reactor is a light-water
moderated reactor running on highly enriched uranium, with enrichment from 10% to 80%68.
The Soviet Union also provided the HEU fuel until its own demise in the 1990s. With
this reactor, the Isotope Production Laboratory, a facility for handling irradiated materials,
was provided. The nominal power of this reactor is 8 MWth. Using the laboratory, early,
small scale plutonium separation experiments may have been conducted with fuel or targets
irradiated in this reactor.69
North Korea started serious fuel cycle activities in the 1980s and the plan was to build and
operate three gas-cooled, graphite moderated, natural uranium fueled reactors. A 5 MWe
and 50 MWe reactor were foreseen for the Yongbyon site and a 200 MWe power reactor was
planed at Taechon. The design followed the British Magnox design, where Magnox is the
name of the alloy used for the fuel cladding: magnesium non-oxidizing. The thermal power of
Magnox reactors is typically 4-6 times higher than the above quoted electrical power, so they
are much less efficient than, for instance, pressurized light-water reactors, where this factor
is closer to 3. Apart from efficiency, the choice of Magnox has another severe drawback:
Magnox fuel cladding corrodes in contact with water such that long term storage of spent
fuel under water is not possible. This makes encapsulation or some level of reprocessing
67. Hecker, “Lessons learned.”
68. David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (ISIS Press, 2000),
p. 148.
69. Ibid., p. 92.
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essentially mandatory.70 The attractive features of this design are its simplicity and that it
does not require uranium enrichment or the use of exotic moderators like heavy water. So,
this reactor type was well adapted to North Korean indigenous industrial capabilities. At
the same time, Magnox reactors were originally designed as dual-use facilities to produce
both electricity and weapons-grade plutonium.
The amount of plutonium produced in a reactor can be estimated if the integrated neutron
flux, which is proportional to the total energy produced, is known, or equivalently if a
complete history of the reactor power is available. It turns out that all uncertainty about
the produced amounts of plutonium center on the issue of the completeness, and to a lesser
degree, the uncertainty of the record of the power history. To obtain the produced plutonium
in usable form, the reactor has to be shut down71, the irradiated fuel rods removed, and the
plutonium then needs to be chemically separated from the spent fuel at the Radiochemical
Laboratory. The location of the various facilities can be seen in figure 4.
The time evolution of the burn-up for the 5 MWe is shown in figure 5 which has been
adapted from Nuclear Puzzle and is deemed accurate.72 The information in this figure is
the backbone of the analysis presented here and our quantitative results are based on this
information. The blue curve is based on the declarations made by the DPRK and, thus, the
assumption is that no major refueling has taken place in 1989. The orange curve is derived
assuming that the full core has been replaced with fresh fuel in 1989 under the constraint
of arriving at the same final burn-up. These numbers can be readily converted into reactor
thermal power levels using the fact that there are approximately 50 tonnes of uranium in
this reactor.73 The power levels then form the input for a detailed calculation of the reactor
isotopic composition and fission rates for the various fissile isotopes. The software we used
70. Albright, “How much plutonium does North Korea have?”
71. In principle, Magnox reactors can be refueled under load, but the DPRK seems not to have mastered
this technology at that time.
72. O. Heinonen, Interview by PH, April 16 2013, Heinonen confirms, looking at fig. VI.2 of Nuclear Puzzle
that this is an accurate description of the burn-up.
73. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle.
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Figure 5: Burn-up of the fuel in the 5 MWe reactor as function of time measured in days since
January 1, 1986. The blue curve is based on the values declared by the DPRK, i.e. no major
refueling has taken place in 1989. The orange curve is derived assuming that the full core has
been replaced with fresh fuel in 1989. Figure adapted from Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle.
to compute the relevant reactor parameters is called SCALE74 and is considered a standard
method for this type of problem. The details of the calculation can be found in appendix A.
5 Neutrinos in the DPRK case
The basic analysis techniques developed in the previous section can now be applied to the
specific situation in the DPRK in the time frame of 1986-1994. The central question for
the international community, after the initial discrepancies appeared in 1992, was how much
plutonium the DPRK had separated. The lower bound on this quantity is represented by
assuming that the DPRK’s initial declaration to IAEA was quantitatively correct, i.e. only
90 g of plutonium were separated from a few hundred damaged fuel elements discharged and
replaced during the 1989 shutdown. The upper bound on the amount of separated plutonium
is obtained by assuming that the full core with a burn-up of approximately 200 MWd/t was
discharged in 1989, containing 8.8 kg of plutonium and that this full core was subsequently
74. “SCALE.”
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reprocessed. The North Korean scientists could have produced additional plutonium over a
long period of time by irradiating natural uranium targets in the IRT, resulting in roughly
0.5 kg of plutonium per 250 day run of the IRT. The limited amount of Soviet supplied fuel
and the fact that the IRT was under IAEA safeguards from 1977 on limits the amount the
DPRK could have produced via that route to less than 1 kg.75 Other authors76 estimate the
theoretical upper limit of the amount of plutonium to be as large as 4 kg.
As far as the 5 MWe reactor is concerned, at the time of the first IAEA inspection in
1992, the burn-up and reactor power were the same for both the extreme cases (see figure 5).
Therefore, our analysis will include the hypothetical scenario where neutrino safeguards were
applied before and after the 1989 shutdown77. The specific unique capability represented by
neutrino safeguards in this case derives from the ability to measure the power history and
burn-up independently – any mismatch indicates a fuel diversion.
In the PUREX process for reprocessing, the fission fragments remain in the aqueous phase
and therefore will end up in the waste. Some of these fission fragments produce neutrinos
above IBD threshold even after a considerable time interval has elapsed, which we will refer to
as long-lived isotopes (LLI), in particular: strontium-90 with a half-life of 28.9 y, ruthenium-
106 with a half-life of 372 d, and cerium-144 with a half-life of 285 d. These three isotopes
have large direct fission yields and are produced in amounts which are proportional to the
number of total fissions and thus are accurate tracers of burn-up. Detecting neutrinos from
LLI is a direct method to find reprocessing wastes and, in principle, also yields an estimate
of the amount of plutonium separated. Given the high penetrating power of neutrinos, this
method is equally applicable to buried wastes.
Finally, neutrinos can travel arbitrary distances, and thus a neutrino detector deployed
75. O. Heinonen, Interview by PH, April 16 2013, Heinonen estimates that the upper limit is between
0.5-1 kg, based on the detailed fuel burn-up data the IAEA obtained as part of its safeguards agreement for
the IRT.
76. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle, p. 120.
77. In principle, the amounts of the long-lived isotopes strontium-90, ruthenium-106, and cerium-144 will be
different between the two irradiation histories which leads to differences in the low energy neutrino spectrum
below 3.6 MeV. However, extensive calculations show that the resulting event rate differences in 1992 are
too small to be reliably detected.
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Figure 6: In the left hand panel, 1σ sensitivities to reactor power are shown for varying data
collection periods using a 5 t detector at 20 m standoff from the 5 MWe reactor. Fission fractions
are free parameters in the fit. In the right hand panel, 1σ sensitivities to burn-up are shown,
where power is a free parameter in the fit. The blue curve shows the history under the assumption
of no diversion. The orange curve shows history for the case of a full core discharge in 1989.
for safeguarding the IRT would also be sensitive to neutrinos from the 5 MWe, especially
during times when the IRT is shut down. This signal will allow a remote power measurement
which can distinguish the two cases shown in figure 5.
5.1 5 MWe reactor
In the following analysis, sensitivities to power, burn-up, and plutonium content are deter-
mined based on the declared power history. This history is displayed as blue curves in the
various figures in this section. Comparisons are made to a hypothetical undeclared core
swap to a fresh reactor core during the 70 day shutdown period, displayed as orange curves.
The difficulty in determining the difference between the two curves lies in the fact that after
1992, power and burn-up are the same. As seen in figure 11, after the 1st inspection, all the
fission rates from the four primary fissioning isotopes are identical with or without diversion.
For the following analyses, a standard 5 t detector at 20 m standoff from the reactor is used,
which for a data taking period of one year corresponds to about 95,000 events.
A power sensitivity computation is first considered. The analysis is done using the
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following χ2-function
χ2 =
∑
i
1
n0i
.
[(
N Pth
∑
I
zISI,i
)
− n0i
]2
, (13)
where zI is the fission fraction for isotope I, n0i is the measured number of neutrino events
in energy bin i, and SI,i is the neutrino yield in energy bin i for isotope I. Pth is the thermal
power and N is a normalization constant. Moreover, the fission fractions zI are subject to
a normalization constraint as given in equation 6.
The resulting 1σ sensitivities are shown in the left hand panel of figure 6. This analysis
assumes precise knowledge of the distance from the reactor to the detector and treats them
both as points. Any uncertainty in the geometric acceptance will directly relate into an
uncertainty of the normalization constant, N , and thus into an uncertainty in the power Pth.
Neglecting this potential source of systematic uncertainty, a power accuracy of around 2%
can be achieved.
A similar analysis can be done to determine the sensitivities for burn-up, BU , using
equation 13. In this circumstance, Pth is free in the fit and the fission fractions zI are now
functions of burn-up, determined by a reactor core simulation as described in appendix A.
The results of this analysis are shown in the left hand panel of figure 6. Burn-up across
the history of the reactor has an error of ∼ 100 MWd/t. Closely related to the burn-
up is the amount of plutonium in the nuclear reactor. This analysis is done again using
equation 13. This time, Pth as well as zU235 and zU238 are free parameters as well as the
relative contribution of the two plutonium fission rates, κ, and the resulting sensitivities are
shown as dashed black lines in figure 7. Alternatively, one can use the burn-up sensitivity to
constrain the plutonium content as well. After computing burn-up errors, a reactor model
is used to compute the change in plutonium fissions. This is shown as the solid black error
bars. These errors are given both in terms of raw plutonium fissions in the left hand panel
as well as the corresponding plutonium masses in the right hand panel. In the right hand
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Figure 7: 1σ sensitivities to plutonium are shown for varying data collection periods using a
5 t detector at 20 m standoff from the 5 MWe reactor. The blue curve shows the plutonium-239
history under the assumption of no diversion. The orange curve shows the plutonium-239 history
if there had been diversion. Black dashed error bars show the 1σ sensitivity by measuring the
plutonium fission rates with uranium fission rates and reactor power free in the fit. Solid black
error bars show the 1σ sensitivity determined by constraining the burn-up using a reactor model.
The left plot shows the errors on absolute plutonium fission rates and the right plot show the
corresponding errors for plutonium mass with a shaded exclusion region from the assumption that
all neutrons not needed for fission are available for the production of plutonium.
panel, a very naive exclusion region is shown for comparison. It assumes that each of the
1.7 neutrons per fission not being used to sustain the chain reaction is instead available to
produce more plutonium. This limit is shown as the shaded region in the right hand plot.
5.2 IRT reactor
The IRT is assumed to run for a 250 day period followed by a 100 day shutdown,78 and
the fission rates are computed in appendix C and shown in figure 12. The natural uranium
targets provide much more uranium-238, changing the fission fractions substantially and
allowing an order of magnitude increase in plutonium-239 production and fissions. As with
the 5 MWe reactor, it is assumed that a 5 t neutrino detector is placed 20 m away from this
reactor. The χ2 from equation 13 can be used to determine the thermal power to within
0.6 MW in each 50 day period. All other things the same, the addition of targets will increase
the power output of the reactor. As long as the detector distance and mass were sufficiently
78. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle, pp. 148-165.
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Figure 8: 1σ sensitivities to reactor plutonium fissions are shown for 50 day collection periods
using a 5 t detector, 20 m away from the IRT reactor. Black dashed error bars show the 1σ
sensitivity resulting from measuring the plutonium fission rate with with uranium contributions
and power free in the fit. The solid black error bars show the 1σ sensitivity determined using a
burn-up model. The left plot shows driver only results and the right plot shows results for driver
and targets combined.
well known, the errors would be small enough to clearly notice the power difference caused
by the addition of breeding targets. At the same time, it would be trivial for the operator
to adjust the power with targets to remain the same as without targets, which would reduce
plutonium production by about 25%.
The 1σ errors on plutonium content can be determined by measuring the fission rates
using the χ2 prescription in equation 13 and then converting these to a plutonium mass
using equation 5. Alternatively, one can determine the burn-up in conjunction with a reactor
model and then infer the errors on plutonium mass inventory. The results of the analysis
are shown in figure 8. Similar error bars are found on raw plutonium fission rates, with and
without the targets. Note, that these are also similar to the 5 MWe reactor results. Very
different, however, are the sensitivities to the mass of plutonium. In the case with only
drivers, a neutrino detector would be sensitive to tens of grams of plutonium. With both the
drivers and targets, there is an order of magnitude increase in the errors into the hundreds
of grams of plutonium. The difference is even more pronounced in comparison to the 5 MWe
reactor, where plutonium mass sensitivities in the multi-kg range are obtained. Despite
similar sensitivities for plutonium fission rates, the sensitivity to core inventory is strikingly
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different for the reasons explained in detail in section 2.4. The neutron flux density in the
fuel containing the plutonium is very different for the two configurations of the IRT with
and without the breeding targets. Since the change in plutonium fission rates is relatively
small between these two configurations, we have to conclude that neutrino safeguards is not
effective in determining which configuration is used. Therefore, the spread in plutonium
mass predictions between the two configurations has to be taken as error, which is 0.36 kg,
over one 250 day run. Taking the upper end of the range of plutonium produced in the IRT79
of 4 kg, we see that this requires about 8-10 reactor cycles. Since the errors from a neutrino
measurement between each cycle are statistically independent we find the total error from a
neutrino measurement taking 8 cycles to be 0.36 kg
√
8 = 1.0 kg. In the more realistic case
of no plutonium production in the IRT this measurement translates into an upper bound of
the same size from this source.
5.3 5 MWe reactor power measurement at IRT
An additional benefit of having a neutrino detector at the IRT reactor is that it would also be
sensitive to neutrinos from the 5 MWe reactor. This is particularly useful during times when
the IRT is shut down, which happens for approximately 100 days every year.80 This will
yield two measurement periods of 100 days each for the reactor power of the 5 MWe reactor
during the crucial time, after the 70 d shutdown and before the first inspection, where the
declared power was low, around 8 MWth, but would have been as high as 18 MWth, in order
to bring the second core to the same final burn-up, see figure 5.
Data collection is assumed to start shortly after an IRT shutdown at a point where
all but the long-lived neutrino producing isotopes have decayed away, leaving only the LLI:
strontium-90, ruthenium-106, and cerium-144. This occurs on the order of days. The number
of atoms for each of the LLI was computed using SCALE and is shown in table III. As in
79. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle, p. 120.
80. Ibid., pp. 148-149.
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Figure 9: In the left hand panel events are shown for 200 days of data collection 20 m from the
shut down IRT reactor and 1.2 km from the running 5 MWe reactor. The IRT is assumed to only
contribute to the detected neutrino spectrum through its long lived isotopes shown in black. The
5 MWe reactor is assumed to be running either at the declared 8 MWth, as shown in blue, or at
18 MWth, as shown in orange. The right hand panel shows the 1σ sensitivities to reactor power
resulting from this measurement. The blue curve shows the power history under the assumption
of no diversion. The orange curve shows the power history if there had been diversion.
Table III: Number of long-lived isotope atoms assumed shortly after IRT shutdown.
Isotope strontium-90 ruthenium-106 cerium-144
Amount (atoms) 3.4× 1023 2.8× 1022 2.5× 1023
the previous sections, we use a 5 t detector at 20 m standoff from the IRT and 1.2 km from
the 5 MWe reactor, see figure 4. Data is collected over two 100 day periods and the detected
spectrum is shown in the left hand panel of figure 9. The signal event numbers are small
and therefore we use the appropriate Poisson log-likelihood to define the χ2-function
χ2 = 2
∑
i
[ni log
ni
n0i
− (ni − n0i )] with ni = N Pth
∑
I
zI SI,i + LLIi , (14)
where LLIi is the long lived isotope contribution in the bin i. Resulting sensitivities are
shown in the right hand panel of figure 9. This corresponds to an uncertainty of about
3.8 MWth during the periods of interest. The difference in reactor power for a second core
would be detected at 3.2σ.
This result implies that a larger detector could be used to safeguard several reactors
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in a larger area. In particular, a detector that is sensitive to direction could identify the
reactor that contributed the neutrino and get several power measurements simultaneously.
Also, without the need to be close to a reactor, it could be placed underground allowing for
greater background reduction.81
5.4 Waste detection
In addition to directly monitoring reactors, neutrino detectors can be used for detection of
nuclear waste. With sufficient insight of where waste might be disposed, a nearby neutrino
detector can see the signature of LLI, even after years of storage. Table IV lists the number
of atoms of each of the three primary LLI that would be expected in the waste at the point
in time of the first inspection, roughly 3 years after the 70 day shutdown. In the following
analysis, it is assumed that the complete core was removed during the 70 day shutdown and
the resulting reprocessing wastes are stored together in one of three locations: the “suspected
waste site”, building 500, or the Radiochemical Laboratory.82 All three locations are shown
in figure 4. For building 500, we assume that we can not deploy inside the hatched area,
since this facility was declared to be a military installation exempt from safeguards access.83
The resulting standoff distances are shown in table V.
Table IV: Number of long-lived isotopes at day 2251 for a complete reactor core removed at day
1156 and stored for 3 years.
Isotope strontium-90 ruthenium-106 cerium-144
Amount (atoms) 1.2× 1024 1.4× 1022 3.7× 1022
Due to the low event statistics, a Poisson log-likelihood is used, as in equation 14, with
the difference that the reactor events from the 5 MWe are now background and the signal
are the LLIi. Table V summarizes the results for each location. Figure 10 shows the event
81. Jocher et al., “Theoretical antineutrino detection, direction and ranging at long distances.”
82. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle; O. Heinonen, Interview by PH, April 16 2013, Heinonen does not
believe that the liquid, high-level waste was transferred to building 500.
83. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle, pp. 149-154.
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Figure 10: Total event rates are shown in purple for 1 year of integrated data collection starting in
1992 with a 5 t detector 25 m from spent fuel and 1.83 km from the 5 MWe reactor. The reactor
contribution to total event rates are shown in red and long lived isotope contributions shown in
blue.
rate spectrum in the most promising of the setups considered, the case of the reprocessing
plant. It is found that a detector around 25 m from the waste and 1.8 km from the 5 MWe
reactor would have a 2σ signal after 55 days of data collection. The strongest contributor
to detection capability is the distance from the source.
Table V: Events are integrated over 1 year with a 5 t detector. The waste corresponds to a
complete reactor core discharged in 1989 during the 70 day shutdown. Long lived isotopes are
decayed 3 years before the measurement starts. The expected time to achieve a 2σ detection is
given in the last column.
Location Reactor Fuel Reactor Fuel χ2 2σ Time [y]
Distance [m] Distance [m] Events Events
Building 500 1980 80 10.1 0.9 0.34 ≥10
Suspected Waste Site 1060 25 35.3 8.9 8.22 0.33
Reprocessing Plant 1830 25 11.8 8.9 16.95 0.15
Reprocessing Plant 1800 100 12.2 0.6 0.12 ≥10
5.5 Continuous neutrino observations
In applying neutrino safeguards, like in conventional safeguards, we can use individual mea-
surements taken at different times and apply them in combination to infer what actually
happened. The initial declaration to IAEA by the DPRK admits two extreme cases: both a
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very minor discharge of a few hundred fuel elements and a complete core discharge in 1989
would yield the same overall core configuration at the time inspectors arrived in 1992, see
figure 5.
The real strength of a neutrino detector is evident when it can measure over the history
of a reactor. As seen in figure 6, such a detector is capable of being very sensitive to reactor
power. Thus, if a neutrino detector was present for the lifetime of the reactor, the declared
power would have to match the measured power at all times and, since the burn-up is just the
time integrated thermal reactor power, the burn-up could be inferred from a complete power
history. At the same time, a burn-up measurement, in contrast to an inferred burn-up value,
can also be derived from a neutrino measurement, provided a reliable, but not necessarily
very detailed or accurate, reactor model is available. As will be shown in section 6.1, given
that the bulk quantities in terms of burn-up are the same between the two scenarios, all
conventional methods which can address the issue of the second core also rely on a reactor
model. The diversion scenario that has been considered relies heavily upon the ability to
adjust the power relative to the declared power so that both the power and burn-up match
at a later time. In the presence of a neutrino detector, the difference in burn-up will be
frozen between the declared burn-up and the actual burn-up of the new core. The fact that
a neutrino detector can simultaneously measure power, as well as fission fractions, is what
allows it to detect this difference in burn-up. To determine sensitivity to such a situation, a
modified version of equation 13 is used
χ2 =
∑
t
∑
i
1
n0i,t
[
(1 + αdetector) P
t
th
∑
I
zI(BU t)SI,i − n0i,t
]2
+
(
αdetector
σdetector
)2
. (15)
where t is indexing the time interval for which a measurement is available. αdetector is a
detector normalization parameter with uncertainty σdetector. P
t
th is the average reactor power
in each time bin t. zI are the fission fractions which are a function of the burn-up in each
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time bin t, BU t. The burn-up as a function of time is given by
BU t =
(
t−1∑
τ=1
P τth∆τ
Mcore
)
+BU0 (16)
where ∆τ is the width of the time bin, BU0 the initial burn-up at the start of data taking
and Mcore the mass of the reactor core in terms of fuel loading. If this initial burn-up BU
0
is well known, as it would be if data collection began at start-up, such an analysis greatly
reduces the uncertainty in the total plutonium budget. In table VI, the total error budget
is given through the use of this method, labeled “method 2”, and is shown compared to the
results if only the burn-up but not the power history is measured based on the results of the
previous sections, labeled “method 1”. For method 2 we assumed that reactors start with a
well known composition, that is BU0 = 0 and a detector related uncertainty σdetector = 1%
is achievable and all the P tth are free parameters in the fit. In the case of the 5 MWe reactor,
for both analyses, the question is what is the maximum change in BUx during the 70 day
shutdown. The value of BUx is translated into the resulting plutonium mass sensitivity by
using the reactor model. It is clear that method 1 is less accurate but does not rely on
continuity of knowledge whereas method 2 is much more accurate but requires continuity of
knowledge. Method 2 still offers a significant advantage compared to conventional methods
by providing its results in real-time and not only at some later, unspecified time in the future.
For completeness we also list the plutonium mass sensitivities from the indirect method
and the detection of reprocessing wastes in table VII.
5.6 Impact of backgrounds
So far in this analysis, we have neglected backgrounds not related to neutrino emissions.
The main backgrounds in inverse beta-decay detectors are: accidentals, where two uncor-
related events caused by ambient radiation in the detector accidentally fulfill the delayed
coincidence requirements in both time and energy; fast neutron induced backgrounds, where
40
Table VI: Plutonium content and 1σ uncertainties are given for two analysis techniques for both
the IRT and 5 MWe reactors. Due to the inability to reliably detect the presence of targets in
the IRT reactor, they are assumed to be in the reactor. The detection capability is given for
each 250 day run of the IRT. The 5 MWe reactor plutonium error is a combination of removed
plutonium that may have occurred during the 70 day shutdown and the final plutonium content
in the reactor at the 1994 shutdown. The quantities are independent if data is only taken after
the 1st inspection and correlated if taken from start-up. The flat burn-up analysis adds a fixed
burn-up to each time bin and the final plutonium error is the final plutonium difference between
the burn-up increased data and the expected data. The power constrained analysis assumes
the starting fuel composition is known and the burn-up is given by the integration of the power
with an assumed 1% detector normalization uncertainty. The plutonium error is the maximum
plutonium difference attainable through power increases and fuel removal (in the case of the
5 MWe reactor). Values are given for 1σ sensitivities for maximizing the plutonium available for
core 1 or core 2 respectively. Parenthesis are for uncertainties in cores using only data from
the respective section. Core 3 and core 4 are additional fuel loads that are irradiated in the
5 MWe reactor post-1994 according to Albright and Walrond, North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of
Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium and are added for completeness.
∗ Using uncertainty from Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle
† These two numbers are anti-correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.962.
Reactor
Final Method 1, 1σ Method 2, 1σ
Burn-up Pu Burn-up Pu Burn-up Pu
[MWd/t] [kg] [MWd/t] [kg] [MWd/t] [kg]
IRT/run with targets 3550 0.47 3520 0.47 39 0.01
5 MWe from Core 1 178 8.83 178 9.5
∗
N/A
1st inspection Core 2 648 27.7 95 3.29
5 MWe from Core 1 178 8.83 138 (83) 6.68 (3.76
† ) 43 (1.9) 2.12 (0.11)
start-up Core 2 648 27.7 52 (66) 1.81 (2.30† ) 6.7 (6.9) 0.23 (0.24)
5 MWe Core 3 307 14.6 51 2.17 3.2 0.14
5 MWe Core 4 255 12.3 53 2.36 2.7 0.12
a fast neutron enters the detector without leaving trace and scatters off a proton, which then
is confused with the primary energy deposition of a positron, and subsequently the neutron
thermalizes and captures like a genuine neutron from inverse beta-decay; β-n backgrounds,
where interaction with cosmic ray muons produces a short-lived radioactive isotope which
decays by beta-delayed neutron emission, which mimics a neutrino event. The rate of acci-
dentals is determined by the rate of ambient radioactive decays. Fast neutrons are a result
of cosmic ray interactions in materials surrounding the detector and thus depend on the
rate of cosmic ray muons; the same is true for β-n backgrounds. Therefore, the measured
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Table VII: 1σ uncertainties on the discharged plutonium for core 1 for the IRT parasitic mea-
surement and for the detection of high-level reprocessing waste.
Core 1 burn-up [MWd/t] Core 1 Pu [kg]
Parasitic measurement 51 2.55
Waste measurement
Suspected waste site 56 2.76
Reprocessing plant 34 1.67
background rates due to those two sources have to be scaled from the underground location,
where most current neutrino detectors are located, to the surface. Neutrino detectors are
commonly put underground precisely to reduce these two sources of backgrounds, since deep
underground the cosmic muon flux is strongly attenuated. The scaling of the number of
background events is not purely given by the muon flux, but also, to some degree, depends
on the average muon energy,84 the scaling is given by
R ∝ φµ〈Eµ〉α , (17)
where φµ is the muon flux and 〈Eµ〉 is the average muon energy which, at the surface,
are 127 m−2 s−1 and 4 GeV, respectively.85 α ranges from 0.7 − 0.9 depending on the type
of background. Using the numbers measured in the Double Chooz experiment at a depth
corresponding to 300 meter water equivalent (mwe)86, we can scale to a surface deployed
detector and find 1 d−1 t−1 fast neutron events and 43 d−1 t−1 β-n events, where 1 tonne is
assumed to have the composition of CH2. These rates exceed the accidental rates by a large
factor and therefore we can neglect the accidental backgrounds. This scaling is tested against
several data sets from different experiments spanning a depth range from 850−120 mwe and
the scaling is found to be accurate within a factor of two.87 At very shallow depths of less
84. Y. Abe et al., “Direct Measurement of Backgrounds using Reactor-Off Data in Double Chooz,”
Phys.Rev. D87 (2013): 011102, doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.87.011102.
85. J. Beringer et al., “Review of Particle Physics (RPP),” Phys.Rev. D86 (2012): 010001, doi:10.1103/
PhysRevD.86.010001.
86. Overburden is commonly quoted in units of meter water equivalent (mwe), typically 1 m of rock/soil
corresponds to about 2-3 mwe.
87. Abe et al., “Backgrounds.”
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than 10 mwe, the hadronic component of cosmic radiation is non-negligible and the scaling
relation in equation 17 is probably no longer valid. With this caveat in mind, we show in
table VIII the noise to signal ratios for the various detector deployment scenarios. Values
smaller than 1 indicate that the current detector technology is likely to be sufficient and
values larger than 1 indicate that improvements in background rejection are needed. The
Table VIII: Noise to signal ratios for a surface deployed detector.
Source Fast neutron suppression β-n suppression
5MWe 0.07 0.21
IRT 0.14 0.43
IRT parasitic 260 1050
Waste 740 3080
required rejection factor can be reduced significantly by providing a moderate overburden of
10-20 mwe, which, in principle, can be engineered into the detector support structure.
Fortunately, there is a significant on-going experimental effort in several countries to
address the R&D for neutrino detectors with greatly improved background rejection. These
initiatives are motivated by the search for a new particle called a sterile neutrino88 through
the use of neutrinos from reactors with detectors placed within meters of the reactor core.
The close proximity to a reactor core results in a high-background environment which can
include a significant flux of fast neutrons and high-energy gamma-rays from the reactor itself.
Almost all reactor sites under consideration offer only very minimal overburden of 10 mwe
or less. Therefore, these experiments face essentially the same level of problems in terms
of signal to noise conditions as safeguards detectors would under the conditions outlined
in this paper. Specifically, there are, to name but a few, the PROSPECT collaboration in
the U.S.,89 the DANSS90 project and NEUTRINO-491 in Russia, the STEREO project in
88. Abazajian et al., “Light Sterile Neutrinos: A White Paper.”
89. Z. Djurcic et al., “PROSPECT - A Precision Reactor Neutrino and Oscillation Spectrum Experiment
at Very Short Baselines” (2013).
90. I. Alekseev et al., “DANSSino: a pilot version of the DANSS neutrino detector” (2013).
91. A.P. Serebrov et al., “On possibility of realization NEUTRINO-4 experiment on search for oscillations
of the reactor antineutrino into a sterile state” (2013).
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France, and the SOLID project in Belgium. Each experiment has chosen a unique approach
to address the challenges of a high noise to signal ratio and some experiments have already
reached the prototype stage.
6 Application to the 1994 crisis
6.1 Conventional methods
The events in 1994 put a premium on understanding the actual history of the North Korean
plutonium program; a vivid interest in this problem remains in the aftermath. The actual
text of the Agreed Framework states
[. . . ] before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full
compliance with its safeguard agreement with IAEA (INFCIRC/403), [. . . ] with
regard to verifying accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all
nuclear material [. . . ] Section IV, Paragraph 3
In 1994, and even today, there has been a need to resolve the question of whether there
was significant reprocessing prior to 1992. It comes as no surprise that actual methods,
relying on more conventional means, were devised. We will briefly review those conventional
methods.
The unloading of the 5 MWe core in June 1994 provided a crucial opportunity to acquire
data that would allow a determination of whether there was a partial or complete core
unloading in 1989. The DPRK, aware of this possibility, tried to prevent IAEA from gaining
this information by unloading the core very quickly and, by doing so, made it impossible
to infer the exact position of a fuel element inside the core. Unfortunately, there is little
published on the details of how a measurement would have proceeded and we have to rely on
interviews with experts. The basic concept of the method is to map out the three dimensional
burn-up distribution inside the reactor core. If the declaration by the DPRK, that only a
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few hundred damaged fuel elements were replaced in 1989 were true, then there should be a
discontinuity in the burn-up distribution at the position of the replaced fuel elements.92 On
the other hand, if more than those few hundred were replaced then discontinuities would show
up at many more locations. If the whole core was replaced a continuous distribution would
emerge. Overall, there are about 8,000 fuel elements and the goal is to find a discrepancy
concerning as few as several hundred fuel elements. Therefore, a sizable sample of about 300
fuel elements is required.93 There are two principal methods to determine the burn-up of
spent fuel: one is destructive sampling with subsequent isotopic analysis and the other is to
measure the characteristic radioactivity emanating from a spent fuel element. Destructive
sampling was (and is) exceedingly difficult in this context.94 The other possibility to measure
burn-up relies on measuring gamma-emission from mostly cesium-137, which is a good proxy
for burn-up. According to an expert from Los Alamos National Laboratory who was closely
involved in the 1994 DPRK issue, this technique would provide burn-up errors below 5% if
good quality calibration data existed.95 This method, in principle, has been calibrated on
British Magnox fuels. Applying this type of measurement to several hundred of the spent
fuel elements and knowing their location in the core presents a viable method to reconstruct
the three dimensional burn-up distribution. None of the interviewed experts was willing
to make a statement as to what level of precision, in terms of partial core reloads and
extracted plutonium amounts, would have resulted. However, we can put a lower limit on
the achievable error by assuming that the overall systematic errors are less than 5% and the
errors for individual fuel elements are in the 1-5% range.96 Therefore, the overall accuracy
very roughly should be in 1-5% range.
This estimate coincides with the accuracy of a method which is based not on the sampling
of spent fuel but instead on sampling the graphite moderator in the reactor. The idea is
92. Heinonen, Interview ; B. Reid and C. Gesh, Phone interview by PH, May 15 2013.
93. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical , p. 170.
94. Reid and Gesh, Interview .
95. H. Menlove, private communication.
96. Ibid.
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elegant and simple; the graphite moderator is in the reactor for the entire lifetime of the
reactor and thus it will be exposed to all the neutrons produced throughout the history of
reactor operation. Since plutonium results from neutron capture on uranium-238, the total
amount of plutonium produced is strictly proportional to the number of all neutrons. Even
reactor grade graphite contains traces of other elements like boron or titanium and both
these elements have stable isotopes, specifically boron-11 and titanium-49, which result from
neutron capture. Therefore, the ratios boron-10/boron-11 and titanium-48/titanium-49 will
decrease with the total neutron fluence. This graphite isotope ratio method (GIRM) was first
proposed by Fetter in 199397 and subsequently developed in considerable detail at Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory. In an actual application, samples from the graphite would
be taken at a few hundred strategically chosen points throughout the core and the isotope
ratios would be determined by mass spectroscopy. This data then can be used to reconstruct
a three dimensional neutron fluence distribution which then, in turn, can be converted to the
total amount of plutonium produced in the reactor through its entire lifetime. This method
was experimentally verified at a British reactor98 with an accuracy in the 1-5% range.99 This
method is quite invasive and requires extensive cooperation between the national authorities
and operator of a reactor in question, and the state or organization carrying out the testing.
It has the advantage that it is tamper resistant and the historical record, in the form of the
graphite moderator of the 5 MWe reactor, is still available.
We have reviewed two methods: one based on gamma-ray emission of spent fuel and the
other on isotope ratios in the graphite moderator. Both methods rely on several hundred
samples collected across the reactor and a subsequent reconstruction of three dimensional
distributions of either burn-up or neutron fluence. For the first method we can only provide
a rough estimate of accuracy, whereas for GIRM the errors have been experimentally deter-
97. Steve Fetter, “Nuclear Archeolgy: Verifying Declarations of fissile-material production,” Science and
Global Security 3 (1993): 237–259.
98. Bruce Reid et al., Trawsfynydd plutonium estimate, 13528, technical report (Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, 1997).
99. Patrick Heasler et al., “Estimation procedures and error analysis for inferring the total plutonium (Pu)
produced by a graphite-moderated reactor,” Reliability Engineering and System Safety 91 (2006): 1406–1413.
46
mined; the rough estimate and the experimentally determined error are in the same range
of 1-5%. The method relying on spent fuel measurements ultimately requires additional
information, e.g. that a few hundred rods were exchanged in 1989, to make inferences about
alternative core histories which lead to the same total burn-up. The GIRM method, on the
other hand, can directly address the cumulative plutonium production in the core and thus
does not rely on additional information. Comparing this to the results that can be obtained
from neutrino measurements, see table VI, we see that neutrino measurements, which do
not rely on knowing the core history, reach about 15% accuracy based on the burn-up of a
given core. Again, for alternative fuel histories which lead to the same burn-up, this method
requires additional information. If the whole fuel cycle can be monitored the neutrino ac-
curacy improves to about 1%. The overall accuracy of neutrino measurements falls in the
same general range as those achievable by conventional means. Each of the techniques con-
sidered here has different requirements for additional information to resolve equal-burn-up
alternative fuel histories, only GIRM can resolve those without extra information.
Another marked difference is the level of intrusiveness, which in descending order goes
from GIRM, which requires drilling sizable holes into the moderator; to the sampling of spent
fuel, which requires considerable access during refueling; and then to neutrino monitoring,
which only requires access to the exterior of the reactor building. Also, neutrinos are the only
method providing essentially real-time information, a significant advantage in the context of
break-out scenarios. Up to the point of the break-out, all information is available, whereas
for the conventional methods, the information can be obtained only at very specific points
in time, well after the actual plutonium production took place. If the break-out happens
between the time of plutonium production and the time when conventional means can be
applied, no information is obtained at all – like in the case of the DPRK.
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6.2 Neutrinos
Based on the quantitative results and the time-line of events in 1994, see figure 3, the
following scenario may have been put into effect:
• The IRT is under full neutrino safeguards with a dedicated 5 tonne detector from 1978
on, which is located outside the IRT reactor building at the southern wall.
• The 5 MWe is under full neutrino safeguards with a dedicated 5 tonne detector from
May 1992 on, which is located outside the 5 MWe reactor building at the western wall.
• A search for neutrino emissions from the reprocessing waste is initiated in November
1992. Three 5 tonne detectors are deployed: one at the reprocessing plant; one at the
suspected waste site, located above the center of the waste site; and one at building
500, located right outside the southern fence.
This scenario is fully consistent with the actual safeguards access the IAEA had and, in
particular, all detector deployment locations reflect actual physical access. As a result, the
detectors at the IRT and 5 MWe have a standoff of 20 m, the detectors at the suspected
waste site and reprocessing plant have a distance of 25 m, and the one at the building 500
has a distance of 80 m.
Furthermore, we assume that in 1989 the DPRK discharged the complete first core, which
seems to be corroborated by the declaration of the DPRK in 2008 that it possesses 30 kg of
plutonium.100 After reprocessing of the spent fuel, the waste was stored somewhere in the
reprocessing plant.101 Finally, we also assume that the burn-up declared by the DPRK in
1992 is indeed correct.102 This completely specifies the scenario.
The first relevant piece of data would be obtained by the IRT detector during periods
when the IRT is shut down, about 100 days out of each year. The neutrino signal stemming
100. Albright and Walrond, North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium.
101. Heinonen, Interview .
102. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle; Heinonen, Interview .
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from the operation of the 5 MWe is clearly detectable at this detector location and provides
a measurement of reactor power. In 1989, this signal would have been recorded but would
not have raised any special concern, since the 5 MWe was not under safeguards at this time.
At most, this data would have helped to corroborate U.S. government analyses of satellite
imagery to ascertain the operational history of the 5 MWe. However, soon after the DPRK
had submitted its initial declaration to the IAEA, in May 1992, this data would have resulted
in a discrepancy which, in combination with the results from environmental sampling would
have led to the conclusion that a large amount of plutonium had been separated in 1989.
This measurement, according to table VII, has a sensitivity which corresponds to 2.55 kg
plutonium, or equivalently to a 8.83/2.55 = 3.5σ detection, meaning the IAEA would have
known that a significant fraction of the first core had been discharged with a confidence of
1 in 1 900. Taking 4 kg of plutonium as the quantity needed for a nuclear bomb, this result
translates into a 1 in 13 confidence that the DPRK has at least enough plutonium for one
bomb.
In November of 1993, after a year of data collection, the detectors at the suspected waste
site would not have found anything nor would the detector at building 500, the former result
proving that only a small amount of high-level waste could be present at the suspected
waste site and the latter being insignificant since the distance to the waste is too large. The
detector at the reprocessing plant would have shown the presence of high-level radioactive
waste,103 corresponding to a plutonium accuracy of 1.67 kg. That is, with a confidence of
1 in 1,000,000, the presence of reprocessing waste would have been confirmed. Moreover,
with a confidence now of 1 in 270, it would have been known that enough plutonium for
one weapon was processed. Six months later, in May 1994, the 5 MWe detector would have
confirmed the burn-up declaration of the DPRK with an accuracy of 15%. In combination,
these results would have implied a 56% chance of there being enough plutonium for two or
103. Heinonen, Interview ; Siegfried Hecker, Report of Visit to the Democratic People’s Republic of North
Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon, Feb. 12-16, 2008., technical report (Center
for International Security and Cooperation, 2008).
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more bombs.
Overall, had the DPRK allowed the detectors to be installed and operated, neutrino safe-
guards would, in the scenario considered, have changed the state of information significantly.
The existence of a separate first core would have been established with very high confidence
and the fact that this core was reprocessed would have been known to very high confidence.
It would have been known, with very high confidence, that at least enough plutonium for
one bomb has been separated. There would have been some indication that there would be
enough separated plutonium for two bombs. Again, if the DPRK had allowed the use of
neutrino detectors, all of this knowledge would have been available by the end of 1993.
Assessing the impact this additional knowledge would have had on the course of events
and the policies driving those events is difficult and will have to remain speculative. From
an IAEA perspective, the DPRK would have been found in substantial violation of the NPT
and the Director General would have to report his findings to the Board of Governors and,
as result, the matter would have been referred to the UN Security Council. Furthermore,
the history of the North Korean plutonium production would have been known including
a reasonably accurate account of the amount of separated plutonium. The ability of the
IAEA to deliver such a detailed picture, despite extensive efforts on the side of the DPRK
to obfuscate, in a timely manner would have been counted as a major success.
As far as the U.S. and the DPRK are considered, we note that the primary goals and
motivations would have remained invariant for both sides. The U.S. still would have wanted
to prevent any further production of separated plutonium104 and the DPRK still would have
wanted to obtain maximal material and political gains for eventually accepting any U.S.
demands. Both parties would have remained keen to avoid war on the Korean peninsula,
since for the U.S. the number of casualties and financial burden would have appeared difficult
to justify and a war would clearly be against the interest of its close ally South Korea. For the
DPRK, or more specifically its leadership, a war would constitute the ultimate catastrophe
104. R. Gallucci, Interview by PH, April 17 2013, According to Gallucci the main objective of the U.S. at all
stages of the 1994 crisis and the subsequent negotations was to prevent any further plutonium production.
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resulting in regime change, at a minimum, and likely captivity or worse for the very top
echelons of government. These stakes remain for both sides to this day and the mutual
awareness thereof has provided some measure of stability to the Korean peninsula.
In view of the information provided by neutrinos, both parties would have lost the benefit
of ambiguity, which would have forced the U.S. to act decisively. For North Korea, it would
have become much more difficult to pretend that a mere accounting problem had occurred.
As a result, the tension would likely have risen much more sharply resulting in the peak of
the crisis at a much earlier time, now the fall of 1993 instead of June 1994.
There are many arguments which can be levied against the scenario described in the
preceding paragraphs. On the technical side, neutrino detectors which achieve the required
level of background rejection did not exist in the 90s and do not exist now, at least not with
demonstrated capabilities. In reply to this criticism we point to the discussion in section 5.6,
where also a brief summary of the current R&D efforts toward better detectors is given.
On the historical side, any attempt at counter-factual history ultimately remains a piece of
fiction and, while some story lines may be more plausible than others, there is no way to
really know what was known by whom given the actual circumstances, or what differences
antineutrino monitoring, as described in this paper, would have made in the interactions and
outcomes. On the policy side, safeguards generally do not rely on secret technologies and
black boxes. States entering a safeguards agreement with the IAEA have the right to require
a complete specification and understanding of the employed technologies to ascertain their
right of protection of trade secrets and information that is sensitive with respect to national
security. The DPRK is no exception to this rule105 and its scientists are knowledgeable and
competent experts, which certainly would have the ability to understand all implications of
neutrino safeguards as outlined here.106 Given that they made every effort to conceal the
true history, they also would have tried to thwart neutrino safeguards. Neutrino safeguards
is not necessarily more difficult to thwart than other means, it just requires different counter
105. Reid and Gesh, Interview .
106. Heinonen, Interview ; Reid and Gesh, Interview .
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measures. This back-reaction has been completely neglected, in part because it would add
another layer of speculation and because it is a historical fact that the IAEA’s trace analytic
capabilities caught the North Korean experts off guard.
7 Summary & Outlook
Neutrino reactor monitoring offers unique capabilities which seem to make this method – as
proposed more than 30 years ago – a useful tool for safeguards. Also, neutrino detectors have
been continually refined since the days of Cowan and Reines and can be considered a mature
technology. Given the mechanisms of neutrino production and detection, neutrino safeguards
provide bulk measurements of reactor core parameters like power or burn-up. This is to be
contrasted with the current safeguards approach which largely relies on item accountancy
and, in particular, neither power nor fuel burn-up are actually measured by the IAEA107 or
verified through independent calculations for any reactor. The IAEA is apparently satisfied
that the existing arrangements are adequate for commercial power reactors of the boiling
and pressurized water types, especially as long as a once-through fuel cycle without repro-
cessing is considered. As a result, it has been difficult to show neutrino safeguards would
provide a decisive advantage in comparison to more conventional techniques, especially since
neutrino detectors are larger and more expensive than most equipment currently used by
the IAEA. The fact that, in the literature, a rather diverse set of results, in terms of the
applicability to specific safeguards issues, is found108 may have a further detrimental effect
on the perception of neutrino safeguards. These widely varying results can be attributed,
107. Doyle, “Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and
Policy.”
108. Bernstein et al., “Nuclear reactor safeguards and monitoring with anti-neutrino detectors”; Nieto et
al., “Detection of anti-neutrinos for nonproliferation”; Huber and Schwetz, “Precision spectroscopy with
reactor anti-neutrinos”; Misner, “Simulated Antineutrino Signatures of Nuclear Reactors for Nonprolifer-
ation Applications”; Bernstein et al., “Nuclear Security Applications of Antineutrino Detectors: Current
Capabilities and Future Prospects”; Bulaevskaya and Bernstein, “Detection of Anomalous Reactor Activity
Using Antineutrino Count Rate Evolution Over the Course of a Reactor Cycle”; Hayes et al., “Theory of
Antineutrino Monitoring of Burning MOX Plutonium Fuels”; Huber, “Spectral antineutrino signatures and
plutonium content of reactors.”
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to a large degree, on differing assumptions about detector parameters and different level of
statistical treatment. The choice of detector parameters often is inspired by the wish to be
particularly realistic or thrifty, which seems to be a classical case of what Donald Knuth
calls premature optimization.109 Furthermore, many analyses are rate-based which leads to
serious deficiencies in sensitivities since there is a pronounced degeneracy between reactor
power and fission fractions when spectral information is ignored110.
In this paper we have taken a different approach – with the North Korean nuclear crisis
of 1994 we have identified a real-world scenario in which traditional safeguard techniques
ultimately were unable to resolve the key questions and for which sufficient technical infor-
mation is publicly available to perform a detailed analysis. Moreover, we base our detector
parameters on the overall acceptable size and weight of the entire detector system, which we
envisage to fit inside a standard 20 ft intermodal shipping container. We also assume that
the detector will be able to operate at the surface. Together with the standard packaging
this will provide a great deal of flexibility in the choice of deployment locations. The price to
pay is that the detector has to have excellent background rejection, which seems to exclude
single volume liquid scintillator detectors and favors finely segmented solid detectors, see sec-
tion 5.6. Detectors with these capabilities currently do not exist, but a basic science question
related to the possible existence of a new particle, a so-called sterile neutrino, has triggered
a large number of experimental efforts to perform reactor neutrino experiments at a range
of several meters from compact reactor cores. These experiments face enormous challenges
from reactor-generated backgrounds and, therefore, have to solve the background rejection
issue. Many of the new designs do not rely on large-area photo-detectors, which are typically
hand-made in small numbers and therefore are very expensive. New detector designs have
the potential to become more affordable in industrial production. Therefore, there is ample
reason to assume that within a few years detectors with the required characteristics will be
109. Donald E. Knuth, “Computer programming as an art,” Communications of the ACM 17, no. 12 (1974):
667–673.
110. cf. compare the results in () with the ones in ()
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available at more reasonable prices.
Spectral analysis of neutrino emissions from a reactor requires an accurate understanding
of the neutrino yields from fissile isotopes. Recently, there have been a number of publications
addressing the issue of neutrino yields and many of the previously accepted results from the
late 1980s have been called into question. In section 2.2, we point out, that while the
absolute neutrino yields differ significantly between different calculations, the differences in
neutrino yields between the fissile isotopes are predicted quite consistently. Ultimately, these
questions should be settled by a calibration measurement at a reactor with well-known core
composition.
In section 2.4, we developed a quantitative framework to determine the plutonium mass
inventory of a number of different reactor types from neutrino spectroscopy and based our
study on detailed reactor burn-up simulations. In figure 2, we summarized these results as
a function of the reactor thermal power for an analysis which makes no assumptions about
the history of reactor power. In comparing various reactor types and their suitability for
neutrino safeguards, we identified the neutron flux density, which is closely related to the
power density, as the main parameter of influence.
We showed that antineutrino safeguards could enable the IAEA to detect unreported plu-
tonium production or diversion of declared plutonium at the one significant quantity amount,
i.e. 8 kg of plutonium within 90 days at 90% confidence level at light-water moderated re-
actors producing less than 1 GWth power and at heavy-water moderated reactors producing
less than 0.1 GWth power. These results suggest that the heavy-water reactor at Arak in
Iran with an estimated thermal power of 0.04 GWth could be an ideal target for neutrino
safeguards, and a detection limit of 4.4 kg plutonium within 90 days at 90% confidence level
seems possible. Graphite moderated reactors, on the other hand, are more difficult due to a
relatively low power density.
We also developed an analysis method based on the fact that the isotopic abundance of
the various fissile isotopes as a function of burn-up is governed by reactor physics and conse-
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quently these quantities are correlated in a well-defined manner, as explained in section 2.3.
In this case, the problem can be rephrased in terms of reactor power and burn-up and this
improves the sensitivity by roughly a factor of two. The reactor model required for this type
of analysis does not have to be extremely detailed or accurate, since only the gross burn-up
evolution is required.
For our purposes, the North Korean nuclear program consists of three pieces: the IRT, an
8 MWth light-water research reactor supplied by the USSR, which is fueled with HEU and has
been under IAEA safeguards since 1977; the 5 MWe reactor, a 20 MWth graphite moderated
natural uranium fueled reactor; and the Radiochemical Laboratory, a reprocessing facility
which can extract plutonium from the spent fuel using the PUREX process. The central
question was whether the fuel in the 5 MWe reactor was the original core load or whether
there was an earlier undeclared refueling during the shutdown in 1989. The discharged fuel
would have yielded about 8.8 kg of plutonium, sufficient for at least one nuclear bomb. Our
technical analysis is to a large degree based on the data presented in Nuclear Puzzle, which we
use as input for detailed reactor core simulations for both the IRT and the 5 MWe reactors.
The North Korean declaration of the burn-up history of the 5 MWe is such that the core
configuration in terms of measurable quantities like burn-up and reactor power is virtually
identical for both the one-core and two-core scenarios. Therefore, safeguards techniques,
both conventional and neutrino-based, have to resort to secondary observables. In the case
of neutrinos, secondary signatures focus on a measurement of reactor power by a neutrino
detector deployed to implement the safeguards agreement for the IRT, which has been in
force since 1977. This signal is visible only when the much closer and, hence, brighter
neutrino source represented by the IRT is not in operation, which occurs for about 100 days
per year. This measurement would provide evidence for the presence of a second core with
a confidence of 1 in 1 900 (3.5σ), see section 5.
Another secondary signature, which can be exploited with neutrinos is the detection
of the presence of reprocessing wastes, which contain long-lived fission fragments, some of
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which emit detectable neutrinos. Historically, three sites have been suspected to be the
potential disposal locations: Building 500, a suspected waste site, and the Radiochemical
Laboratory. The map in figure 4 shows the relative locations. For the latter two sites a
neutrino safeguards detector would have been able to detect the presence of the reprocessing
wastes with a confidence of better than 1 in 600, see section 5. For the 1994 crisis, the
application of neutrino safeguards could have resulted in significantly reduced uncertainty
about North Korean intentions.
In a more general context, we also studied the resulting sensitives assuming that neutrino
safeguards had been available from the start-up of the 5 MWe reactor and showed that if a
continuous measurement of reactor power by neutrinos had been available, which could then
be compared to a measurement of the burn-up by neutrinos at a later point, there would
have been very little room for undeclared plutonium production or refuelings; accuracies
corresponding to 1-2 kg of plutonium would have been achieved, see table VI. Our work
shows that even graphite moderated reactors can be safeguarded successfully using neutrino
monitoring. Furthermore, we compared the abilities of neutrino safeguards with conventional
capabilities in section 6.1 and found that those conventional techniques have to rely on a
level of reactor physics modeling comparable to the more advanced analysis techniques we
have presented. Provided the extensive effort and funds required for such modeling can
be expended, the overall accuracy of conventional techniques should be in the 1-5% range,
whereas neutrino techniques are in the 5-15% range in terms of plutonium content. The
crucial advantage neutrino safeguards offer stems from the near real-time data acquisition
during reactor operation, whereas the conventional methods require a reactor shutdown
and a defueling of the reactor. Neutrino safeguards also is entirely non-invasive; at 20 m
standoff the detector can be deployed outside the reactor building. In the context of break-
out scenarios, deferring the ability to know how much plutonium was produced or whether a
diversion has taken place until a later point in time, when there is no guarantee of safeguards
access at the required level, is problematic – but this is what conventional techniques have
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to rely on and have done in the case of the DPRK, with the known result.
To summarize, using the North Korean nuclear crisis as a virtual laboratory, we have
found by detailed technical analysis that neutrino safeguards for water moderated reactors
with a thermal power less than 0.1-1 GWth can meet the IAEA detection goals in terms of
plutonium content and timeliness. This makes neutrinos a viable choice for many research
reactors, small, e.g. 40 MWth, plutonium production reactors, and for most of the planned
commercial small modular reactors. Small modular reactors would allow for the inclusion
of a neutrino safeguards system at the design stage. In the specific North Korean case,
we find that neutrinos provide an accuracy which is marginally worse than conventional
methods and, qualitatively, the difference in accuracy seems to be irrelevant. At the same
time, neutrinos allow conclusions about the plutonium content and potential diversion to
be drawn in close to real-time, whereas conventional methods provide the information only
after the fact, once the reactor is shut down and defueled. For all of these applications,
neutrino detectors have to work with minimal or no overburden and the lower the residual
background is, the more versatile the resulting system will be. For very low background
detectors, remote power measurements and the detection of reprocessing wastes becomes an
attractive possibility, in particular for purposes of nuclear archaeology.
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Figure 11: Fissile content of the 5 MWe reactor (left hand panel) and the corresponding fission
rates (right hand panel)
A The 5 MWe reactor
The 5 MWe reactor is a graphite moderated and reflected Magnox reactor using natural
uranium fuel, based on the British Calder Hall design, and runs with a nominal power
capacity of 20-25 MWth. The average burn-up of the fuel elements is 635 MWd/t. The 5 MWe
reactor contains 812 vertical channels, each with up to 10 fuel elements per channel. The
fuel elements are made of natural uranium in a magnesium-aluminum alloy (Magnox) and
a full core consists of 50 MTU. We have based most of our historical information regarding
this reactor and its power history on figure VI.2 in Nuclear Puzzle. The 5 MWe reactor began
operation in January 1986, experienced a 70 day shutdown in 1989, and continued irradiation
past the first IAEA inspections in 1992 until the shutdown in April 1994. We are primarily
concerned with two possible fueling histories: case I, or the no-diversion case, assumes that
the same core was used in the 5 MWe reactor during the entire irradiation period from 1986
to 1994; case II, the core exchange case, is based on the assumption that, during the 70 day
shutdown of 1989, North Korea replaced the irradiated core with a fresh one and continued
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irradiation with a higher-than-declared power to reach the same burn-up as in case I by
the time of the 1992 inspection. The primary safeguards-relevant difference between these
two cases is that in the second case an entire spent fuel load containing about 8.8 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium, is unaccounted for.
We simulate the 5 MWe reactor using the SCALE 6.1.1 software package
111 developed
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. OrigenArp, a subset of SCALE, uses decay data from
ENDF/B-VII112 and neutron information from the JEFF/A-3.0113 databases to compute
burn-up and isotopic composition. OrigenArp is a deterministic approach which approxi-
mates the structure of a reactor core into a zero-dimensional object by using appropriately
weighted cross section libraries. Some libraries, including the Magnox type reactor, are
predesigned and supplied with the SCALE software.
OrigenArp begins by computing depletion equations for each individual isotope in a given
problem. The depletion or Bateman equation is given by
dNi
dt
=
m∑
j=1
lijλjNj + Φ¯
m∑
k=1
fikσkNk − (λi + Φ¯σi)Ni (i = 1, ...,m) (18)
This accounts for processes that produce nuclide Ni in the first two terms and for processes
that destroy nuclide Ni in the last, negative term. The first term represents the decays of
nuclide j to i given by the decay constant, λj, the atom density of nuclide j, Nj and the
branching fraction, lij, for decays from nuclide j to i. The second term indicates neutron
captures into nuclide i given by the space and energy-averaged neutron flux, Φ¯, the fraction
of absorption on nuclide k that produce nuclide i, fik, and the spectrum-averaged neutron
absorption cross section of nuclide k, σk. The last term is the collection of depletion modes
consisting of the decay of nuclide i via decay constant, λi, and neutron absorption with a
spectrum-averaged neutron absorption cross section of nuclide i, σi. The indices are summed
111. “SCALE.”
112. “ENDF database,” http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/exfor/endf00.jsp.
113. “JEFF database.”
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Table IX: Comparison of our SCALE-based results and the numbers presented in Plutonium 1996
for the plutonium content of Magnox fuel as a function of burn-up.
SCALE Plutonium 1996 SCALE Plutonium 1996
Burn-up [MWd/t] %240,241,242Pu %240,241,242Pu kg of Pu kg of Pu
100 0.99 0.75 0.10 0.1
200 1.9 1.5 0.20 0.19
300 2.9 2.3 0.29 0.28
400 3.8 3.1 0.38 0.36
500 4.7 3.7 0.47 0.45
600 5.5 4.4 0.56 0.535
700 6.4 5.1 0.64 0.62
800 7.2 5.7 0.72 0.7
900 8.0 6.3 0.79 0.78
1000 8.8 6.9 0.87 0.86
1100 9.5 ∼7.5 0.94 ∼0.94
1200 10 ∼8.1 1.0 ∼1.02
over all branches including nuclide i. SCALE solves this differential equation via a matrix
exponential method. Short-lived isotopes are removed to prevent loss of numerical accuracy
and calculated using Bateman chains. With the input of initial nuclide concentrations, the
power history, and the reactor configuration, OrigenArp can provide time-dependent fission
rates, radioactivity, and isotopic abundances during and after irradiation.
For our calculations, we have used the Magnox library provided with SCALE. Our first
check of SCALE is to investigate the production of plutonium in comparison to earlier
results.114 We irradiate the Magnox fuel corresponding to 1 MTU of natural uranium for 1000
days at a constant power level to reach a given final burn-up. For example, we can irradiate
the core at 0.7 MW for 1000 days to produce a final burn-up of 700 MWd/t. We then extract
the total amount of plutonium produced and the percentage of 240Pu, plutonium-241, and
242Pu. table IX summarizes the results and compares them with table A.2 in Plutonium
1996 115. We can see that our calculation and the results of Plutonium 1996 consistently
match in the total mass of plutonium produced for various burn-ups. SCALE predicts about
114. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996:
world inventories, capabilities and policies (Oxford University Press, 1997).
115. The numbers in Plutonium 1996 are originally taken from ()
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25% more of the lesser plutonium isotopes compared to Plutonium 1996.
We also perform a comparison of the fissile abundances for the four main fissile isotopes
with the numbers quoted in table VIII.5 in Nuclear Puzzle. We use the OrigenArp sequence
with the Magnox reactor library and the power history inferred from figure VI.2 of Nuclear
Puzzle with an initial fuel amount of 1 MTU. The x-axis of the plot shows the number of days
that have passed after the 5 MWe reactor began irradiation on January 1, 1986. Notable
times are included, such as the 70 day shutdown in 1989 (beginning on t = 1156 d), the first
IAEA inspection in 1992 (t = 2337 d), and the shutdown on April 1, 1994 (t = 3012 d). In
the leftmost panel of figure 11 we have plotted the results for case I and case II, as well as
the data points found in table VIII.5 in Nuclear Puzzle, normalized to a 50 MTU core and
we find excellent agreement. We note that immediately following the 70 day shutdown in
1989, the fissile abundances vary greatly between cases. The difference quickly disappears
as the fresh fuel load is burned at a higher power so that by the first IAEA inspection in
1992 the fissile abundance differences have vanished. The results in terms of mass inventory
and fission rates are shown in figure 11.
B CANDU and LEU reactors
The “H2O, LEU” reactor and the “D2O, NU” CANDU reactor are both calculated in the
same fashion as the 5 MWe reactor. The LEU reactor calculation is done for a typical
pressurized light water reactor. Specifically, we have taken a power history from one such
reactor, namely Ling Ao I, located in the Daya Bay complex in China. Ling Ao I is a
Framatome M310 reactor, which uses a 17x17 AFA 3G fuel assembly. SCALE does not
have this specific library, but does contain the very similar Westinghouse 17x17 array, which
we have used. Details of the Ling Ao I reactor history and fuel composition are taken
from the yearly power histories published via IAEA Operation Experience in Member States
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documents.116 To summarize, Ling Ao I has a total fuel load of 72.4 MTU enriched to 3.7%.
The yearly power histories are converted into OrigenArp input files. The Ling Ao I reactor
runs on a 12 month refueling cycle, meaning that it must shut down about every 12 months
to refuel. Typically, one third of the fuel is replaced with a fresh third, and the fuel rods
are shuffled within the core to reach a flatter burn-up distribution. To simulate this, we
produce three SCALE computations: one third of a core that has been irradiated once,
another third that has been irradiated twice, and the last third that has been irradiated
three times. These three output files are then summed resulting in the final full core. Each
third has been irradiated for approximately 335 days per cycle at an average power of about
965 MWth, resulting in a total power of 2.9 GWth. We acquire the fission rates and the fissile
abundances for the four main fissiles from this final full core sum. The “D2O, NU” is also
calculated via SCALE. We use the CANDU 37-element cross section library in SCALE. The
37-element, as opposed to the 28-element, design was chosen as it is a more common design
for newer CANDU reactors. This simulation was performed with a three year irradiation time
at an average power of 40 MWth with a 8.6 MTU natural uranium fuel load. The CANDU
reactor is run continuously with no refueling periods. From the SCALE output we obtain
the fission rates and the fissile abundances for the four main fissiles. The specifications for
this calculation are intended to mirror the specifications of the Arak reactor in Iran.117
C The IRT reactor
The IRT is a light-water pool-style research reactor and was supplied to the DPRK by
the Soviet Union in the 1960s. First criticality occurred in the IRT reactor on August 15,
1965. The IRT contains 56 core grid compartments during the time of interest here, i.e.
after 1986.118 The exact configuration of the IRT is unknown, but we can base possible
116. Mandula Jiri, “Operating Experience with Nuclear Power Stations in Member States 2005-2011,” http:
//www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Engineering/Publications/2012.html.
117. Albright and Walrond, Update on the Arak Reactor .
118. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle.
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configurations on similar IRT reactors such as the IRT-Sofia119 located in Bulgaria. These
compartments can contain a driver or target element. Drivers are the primary fission source
in this research reactor and are made of highly enriched uranium. The targets, which are
primarily composed of fertile isotopes, such as natural uranium, will experience a small
number of fissions. In 1974, the IRT was upgraded in power from 2 MWth to 4 MWth and
later in 1986 it was upgraded from 4 MWth to 8 MWth. The driver element enrichment
also increased during this time from 10% in 1967 to 80% by 1986.120 Exact inventories are
unavailable, but estimates indicate the DPRK may have had access to at least 92 of these
80% enriched driver elements.121 From 1986 on-wards, 30 driver elements were typically
loaded and the IRT could run for about 250 days out of the year.
SCALE computations for the IRT are more difficult as there is no available cross section
library provided with SCALE. Therefore, we use the Triton and NEWT modules to produce
custom cross section libraries for the IRT calculations. NEWT generates the neutron trans-
port calculation for a user-defined core configuration, which can then be used by Triton over
a sample burn-up history to produce decay and cross section libraries. The input information
we provide consists of detailed isotopic compositions of the driver and target elements as well
as physical parameters of these elements and a core configuration. Information concerning
the driver and target elements is taken from table VIII.6 in Nuclear Puzzle. To summarize,
we are using 80% enriched U-Al alloy drivers with an aluminum cladding in a light-water
moderator surrounded by a reflector. The target elements are natural uranium metal in an
aluminum cladding. We utilize SCALE and the IRT power history provided in table VIII.7
in Nuclear Puzzle along with the initial loading of 6 kg for the drivers and 633 kg for the
targets.
The actual core configuration is not known and detailed designs are unavailable so we
will first determine the impact of the unknown core configuration on the fission rates, as
119. IAEA, Directory of Nuclear Reactors, vol. V - Research, Test and Experimental Reactors (Vienna,
Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1964).
120. Albright and O’Neill, Nuclear Puzzle.
121. Ibid.
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Figure 12: IRT fission rates of a lone driver and target element separately and their sum (left
panel). The abundances of fissile isotopes in the IRT as calculated by the lone sum method (right
hand panel).
these rates determine the neutrino spectrum. We tested several methods of computing the
fission rates of the IRT research reactor. The first group of methods considered a calculation
of a full IRT core with both drivers and targets present. Two core configurations were tested
and are illustrated in figure 14.
The second group of methods consisted of calculating the drivers and targets separately
and then summing the fission rates and fission yields for a full core. For this group we
considered three sub-cases. We calculated one lone driver and one lone target separately,
multiple drivers and multiple targets separately in a first core configuration and multiple
drivers and multiple targets separately in a second, different, core configuration. The specific
dimensions of each element and the two different core configurations can be found in figure 13
and figure 14. For the multiple drivers and targets separately we simply removed either the
target or driver elements in figure 14.
The fission rates across these several methods were found to be nearly identical. The full
core of both targets and drivers produced slightly higher plutonium-239 and uranium-238
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fission rates. This is a result of the additional fission neutrons produced from the interplay
between drivers and targets, which combines with the total neutron flux. This increase is a
very small effect, especially when compared to the uranium-235 fission rate, which dominates
the IRT. From this, we conclude that a specific core configuration has only a minor impact
on the fission rates and we use the lone element and lone driver calculations. The primary
reasoning behind this is to avoid any unverifiable core configuration bias. The fission rates
for the lone element method are given in figure 12. Blue curves indicate fission rates for the
driver, red curves indicate fission rates for the targets and purple curves are the sum of these.
We have only illustrated the three main fissiles that contribute to the overall fission rates.
The drivers comprise the majority of uranium-235 fissions and, thus, the majority of fissions
over all fissiles. The addition of targets increases the plutonium-239 and uranium-238 fission
rates, but these are still an order of magnitude lower than the uranium-235 fission rates.
Again, we see the burn-up effect by the decreasing fission rate of uranium-235 along with an
increase in the plutonium-239 fission rate.
We also wish to track the abundances of the four main fissile isotopes as a function of time
over the given 250 day irradiation cycle of the IRT. The abundances have been calculated
using SCALE in the same fashion as described before. We attempt three different methods,
a lone driver and lone target core individually calculated and then summed, a full core with
drivers and a full core with targets individually calculated and then summed, and a full
core containing both drivers and targets. Again, the differences in these three methods were
extremely minor resulting in the similar conclusion that the core configuration is negligible
when considering the fissile abundances for the IRT. In the right panel of figure 12 we compare
the fissile abundances as produced via the lone target and element separately calculated and
then summed to a full core with table VIII.7 in Nuclear Puzzle. We find that there is an
excellent match between the two results. The largest deviation occurs in plutonium-241 as
there is little of this isotope being produced.
To summarize, we conclude that all methods we tested for computing the fission rates,
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isotopic abundances, and neutrino fluxes for the IRT yield very similar results. The main
effect in the IRT is the addition of breeding targets and we reproduce previous results in the
literature.
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Figure 13: The left hand panel shows the IRT driver element material diagram, whereas the
right hand panel shows IRT target element material diagram.
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Figure 14: The left hand panel shows the IRT full core v1 material diagram, whereas the right
hand panel shows the IRT full core v2 material diagram.
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